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PREFACE 
This thesis is concerned with the development of the 
United States and ASEAN relationship in wheat trade, secur-
ity and protectionism in an interdependent world. Trade 
issues have become important phenomena in explaining future 
state relationships. 
Limited information, except for security, was available 
for this study, because the issue of protectionism at the 
time of writing was an ongoing process within Congress. 
Materials were also sought from the libraries of the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley and the National ~niversity 
of Singapore to supplement my work at Oklahoma State Univer-
sity. 
I wish to acknowledge with gratitude all the people who 
have, in some way, contributed to the completion of this 
thesis and helped me during my stay at Oklahoma State Univer-
sity. Some special individuals deserve utmost gratitude be-
cause without their professional and personal support, this 
thesis would never have become a reality. 
Special gratitude must first be extended to Dr. Harold 
Sare ; Chairman of my committee, for his encouragement, 
suggestions, critcisms, valuable time, and special insight 
into a lifetime pursuit. The time and professional advice 
that Dr. Sare provided me was critical in the completion 
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of this project. But my gratitude to Dr. Sare goes far 
beyond that of simply a professional relationship. If it were 
not for his ability to motivate and to provide encouragement 
during those times when the odds looked overwhelmingly nega-
tive, this thesis may never have been completed. These 
characteristics make Dr. 
credit to his profession. 
Sare , in my opinion, a true 
I would also like to express my gratitude to the other 
members of my corrunittee, Dr. Franz A. von Sauer and Dr. Joseph 
Westphal, for their suggestions, interest and support for 
this work. Their corrunents were always provided in a timely 
manner, indicating their concern for the student. Dr. von 
Sauer deserves special thanks for his encouragement and con-
cern in my ability to finish this thesis on time, and for 
introducing me to the field of comparative politics. 
Special thanks must be extended to Mrs. Perla Buhay-Ward 
for typing this thesis from all the drafts with speed and 
efficiency. 
From a very personal standpoint, I would like to express 
my deepest gratitude to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Naranjan 
Singh for their consistent moral and financial support during 
the course of my studies at Oklahoma State University. At 
the same time, they have instilled in me a sense of confidence 
in own ability to challenge new environments without fear and 
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On Wednesday, October 9, _1985, the Honorable Lee 
Kuan Yew, .Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, 
addressed the joint session of the House and Senate to speak 
out against protectionism and its consequences on economic 
development and stability of the free world and to remind 
legislators of the dangers inherent in the protectionism that 
led to the Depression of the 1930s and its consequenes of a 
1 world war. Such a statement by the Prime Minister reflects 
the growing trend of protectionism in the United States 
as a remedy to reduce U.S. trade deficits. It also reflects 
the growing level of interdependence that nations have 
reached over the years. 
Since World War II, the world has witnessed gradual 
decolonization, increased efforts at regional cooperation 
and, lastly, ·interdependent relationships. The farmer 
European empire began to fade, giving rise to sovereign 
nations, each of which exp~ess policies indeperident of the 
other. I.n Southeast Asia - France, _the Netherlands, the U. s. 
and Britain began to restore full sovereignty on their protec-
torates. During that period, the 1990s, ther_e has been 
a marked tendency toward regional formation so as to pursue 
1 
a common ohjective and to increase the hargaining power of 
regional gro~pings in international relations. 
In 1967, there was the. successful formation of ASEAN, 
2 
a regional organization bringing together Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. (Brunei be-
came a sixth member in January 1984. So that they could 
increase their economic development, these nations began to 
engage actively in international trade, especially with the 
U.S., so as to bring economic prosperity and political stabi-
lity in the region. 
Trade is one of the most important and dominant events 
of our time. World trade has progressed dramatically from 
a very old concept which has been in existence since the 
barter system was established. The exchange of goods tor 
goods marked the beginning of specialization which, in 
turn, led to the development of comparative advantage. The 
idea of comparative advantage, as put forward by economist 
David Ricardo led to the production and trade of the commo-
dity in which one nation has an edge in price and production 
cost over other nations, thereby resulting in economies of 
scale. 
The colonial powers, especially Britain, pushed forward 
the idea of trade, the search. for raw materials, and the open-
ing up of the markets for her finished. goods. At the begin-
ning of the colonization era, .the colonial powers could be 
regarded as trading societies in the sense that these trading 
nations sought to gain from the concept of comparative 
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advant~ge. The present degree of w.orld trade is both. very 
old and totally precedented because the global level o~ trade 
continues to rise rapidly. 
As world trade progresses, it mus.t have some profound 
social, political and economic consequences. It either bene-
fits or, at times, hurts a nation. It has generally 
been accepted that the purpose of engaging in trade is to 
realize the fruits of prosperity through economic development 
and political stability, benefitting both buyer and seller. 
By engaging in international trade, there is also the 
movement of political interest. Economic interest and poli-
tical interests are complementary and not substitutes. That 
is, political and economic cooperation move in the same direc-
tion. Nations have an interest in what the author calls 
"tangible assets" (international trade) and "intangible assets" 
(security/political interest) in an interdependent world. 
Focus of Research 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze U.S. and ASEAN 
relations since 1967 and to see whether or not ASEAN benefit-
ted from its economic and political relationship with the 
United States. Since 1967, there has been a marked increase 
in economic and political relations between the U.S. and 
ASEAN. Economic-and political relations between them are 
characterized as a movement in the same direction. In 
international trade, U.S. exports to ASEAN in 1968 were $942 
million, ~nd by 1983 U.S. exports inc±eased to $12 billion, 
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making ASEAN the fourth trading partner of the u.s. 2 At the 
same time, security interest to deter Soviet Union activities 
has brought both of th.em closer. However, measures are taking 
place in Congress to reduce U.S. trade deficits by passing a 
number of trade protectionist bills so as to bring about fair 
trading practices among nations 
This thesis will focus on U.S. interest in ASEAN and ASEAN 
interest in the U.S. The U.S. interest can be seen in the 
desire to sell her agricultural products, to maintain secu-
rity interest in the region as part of her containment policy 
of Soviet Union expansionism, and to bring about fair trading 
practices. ASEAN interest in the U.S. is the vast open market 
for her exportable items~ the need for U.S. presence in the 
region to deter Soviet Union activities or its proxy's chal-
lenge and to respond to U.S. protectionism measures against 
their products. 
H.ypothesis 
A common view espoused by many of the developing coun-
tries against developed countries is.that the former do not 
benefit from the relationship because the developed nations 
are merely exploiting the developing ones, which are export-
ers of primary products and dependent industrially. Most 
of the scholars that advocate such a view. are nee-Marxist 
oriented. The author calls this the trade pessimist view of 
international relations. Some of the scholars who advocate 
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th.at developin9 countries do not b.enef.it are I.V. Lenin, 
Nikita Kruschev, Andre Gunder Frank, Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy 
and the leading critic, Raul Prebisch. 
ln carrying out this research, Prebisch's hypothesis 
will be used. I.n his thesis, "Secular Declining Terms of 
Trade, ... he advocated that adeveloping countries do not bene-
fit from trade with the developed countries. He hypothesized 
that since developing countries are primary product export-
ers and have to import industrial goods from the developed 
countries, the developing countries, over time, will be receiv-
j 
ing less and less for their· exports. He views the developing 
countries as being exploited to the benefit of the developed 
countries, with the latter seeking to maximize their own bene-
fits at the expense of the former. 
This common Third World hypothesis will be used to ana-
lyze U.S. and ASEAN relations and to see whether ASEAN has 
been exploited or not in her relations with the United 
States, and how it balances out from the American viewpoint. 
Source of Data 
In order to carry out this thes±s, data was obtained from 
sources such as the United Nations and its regional association, 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Food and Agr±cultural Or-
ganization and the U.S. Senate and House hearings on foreign 
trade. Both a qualitative and quantitative approach would 
be used to analyze the relationship between the U.S. and ASEAN. 
Regarding trade figures, dollar amounts will be used to 
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analyze the overall trade pattern between the U.S. and ASEAN, 
including the textile trade. As for the wheat trade between 
ASEAN and the U.S., only quantity figures will be used because 
of price fluctuations in wheat products over time. 
As for the. p.L. 480 program figures on the number of recipi-
ents, there was no data availahle to break dow.:n the percentage 
of w.:heat received by each individual. Nevertheless, wheat 
products have been the major component (80 percent) of P.L. 
480 programs to the ASEAN countries. 
Review of the Literature 
Third World nations have often viewed economic imperial-
ism and international trade as not benefitting them in their 
relations with the Western nations. As such, this section 
seeks to review the hypothesis and the literature of the pes-
simists' view along with the classical theories' of interna~ 
tional trade. 
Raul Prebisch in his thesis "Secular Declining Terms of 
Trade" stated 
. . Developing countries will be receiving less and 
less for their exports and as such do not benefit in 
trade with the developed countries and, at the same 
time, the developing countries export primary products 
and import industrial go4ds, much to the disadvantage 
of developing countries. 
Prebisch was looking at the trade pattern between Latin 
America and the U.S. He noted that Latin American exports 
were receiving less and less revenue because the exports were 
primary. goods, and Latin America had to import industrial 
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goods. This led to the reduction in natural resources within 
Latin America. In order to solve the disadvantage of develop-
ing countries, Prebisch advocated that government policies 
emphasize upon the establishment of import-substitution indus-
tries. This involves the setting up of industries locally 
in order to produce the same product that used to be imported. 
The views that Prebisch advocated was the establishment of an 
"inward looking. strategy" as opposed to being isolated from 
international trade in order for the country to maximize her 
benefits. 
Lewis, a development economist, classified north-south 
trade relations with the northern countries producing indus-
trial goods and "exporting" the surplus to the southern coun-
tries which are primary producers only. 5 He noted that such 
international structure was to the disadvantage of the south 
because the concentration of exports are in primary products. 
Lewis believed that international trade was to the disadvan-
tage of the developing countries because their industries 
would only produce primary products and would not be able to 
export any industrial goods. Lewis failed to mention that 
the reason majority of the developing countries export prima-
ry goods is because of the need to acquire the necessary 
foreign exchange for economic development. This does not 
necessarily mean the developing countries are being exploited 
by the advanced countries. 
Economists Baran and Sweezy classified the relations of 
the advanced and developing countries as exploitative. The 
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growth of capitalism in the developing countries is impossi-
ble because of the surplus drain, which results in the deve-
loping countries being continuously dependent on the developed 
countries. 6 They view the world system as the continuous ex-
ploitation of the developing countries by the developed ones 
because the latter want to preserve their industrial base. 
As a result, developing countries would not be able to produce 
the industrial goods with which to compete with the developed 
countries. The views of Baran and Sweezy reflect the common 
vision of international imperialism that developin~ have con-
verning the activities of the developed countries. 
Frank, another economist, discussed "independent deve-
lopment" in which Third World trade relations with the deve-
loped world leads to the economic development of the capital-
capitalists themselves and make developing countries worse 
off. 7 He said that because of interdependence after World 
War II, the developing countries have become worse off through 
trade by the transfer of surplus value to the developed coun-
tries. Frank viewed Latin American trade with the developed 
countries as detrimental to Latin America because the benefits 
from trade only accrue to the developed countries which seek 
to maximize their benefits at the expense of the developing 
col.in tries. 
The work of Lenin has influenced the thinking of 
the Third World about their relations with the developed na-
tions, especially since they were former colonies of western 
powers. According to Lenin, economic imperialism (interna-
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tional trade) is an exploitation of less developed nations 
in which the developed countries participate in the "struggle 
for spheres of economic interest in which the richer and the 
most powerful nations exploit the weaker ones. 118 
Besides these pessimists' views of international trade 
relations, there are also advocates who point out that trade 
relations do benefit the nation. The person who pushed for-
ward the idea of international trade is Adam Smith on the 
basis of Absolute Advantage and that it might benefit both 
nations. This involves a countryLs specialization on 
the commodity of its absolute advantage and to exchange a 
part of its output for the commodity in which it has an abso-
lute disadvantage. 9 Through this, buyer and seller benefit. 
How.ever, in reality today, the ahsolute advantage principle 
only explains a very s_mall portion of; international trade 
relations. 
Working on Adam Smith's idea, .David Ricardo advocated 
the concept of "comparative advantage." It is based on 
the labor theory of value in wh.ich a nation, .although less 
efficient than others in the production of commodities, can 
still benefit from trade by the less efficient nation special-
izing in the production and export of that good in which its 
disdavantage is the least. 10 Although the idea of c9~pa­
rative advantage governs today's trade relations, Ricardo, 
however, emphasizes upon labor as the only cost factor in 
production. As such, this idea of labor is not acceptable, 
but the idea of comparative advantage still is valid today. 
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Trade relations among nations today are governed by the 
Heckscher-Ohlin Theory. Borrowing heavily upon Ricardo's 
comparative cost theory, but rejecting the labor theory of 
value, the Heckscher-Ohlin Theory, commonly known as the 
factor-endowment theory, states 
... A nation will export the commodity intensive 
in its relatively abundant and cheap factor and 
import the commodity intensive in its relative 
scarce and expensive factor. This would bring about 
about equalization of relative and absolute returns 
to homogeneous factors across nations.11 
The Hechscher-Ohlin Theory shows the level of inter-
dependent trade among nations. As such, each nation seeks 
to promote its national interest and to profit from trading 
with the other countries. Through trade, states are able to 
specialize and export those products in which it faces the 
least cost of production--manufacture and social factors--
and import the goods for which the cost of local manufacture 
is greatest. The final result is that trading nations bene-
fit mutually from the e(change·and achieve.their individual 
goals. 
In subsequent chapters, this thesis will discuss the 
formation of ASEAN, U.S.-ASEAN trade since 1967, U.S. poli-
tical interest in the region, and trade issues of mutual 
interest. 
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CHAPTER II 
FORMATION AS A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
Introduction 
Under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, states 
have the right to form regional organizations to decrease 
hostilities, increase cooperation, strengthen bargaining 
positions vis-a-vis the rest of the world, and promote 
political stability.· Since World War II, various attempts 
at regional groupings have been made throughout the world. 
The most successful of these has been the European Economic 
Community (EEC) which was formed to rebuild Europe's war-
torn economies, to increase interdependent trade among the 
nations of western Europe, and to promote political stabili-
ty in the region. 
With the idea of nationalism and to reduce feelings of 
insecurity among the newly independent nations of the Third 
World, various attempts have been made to form regional or-
ganizations in Southeast Asia. The complexity of the region 
with diverse economic, political and social structures made 
regional grouping a difficult task. Nationalism, ethnic 
groups, fear and suspicions of each other and boundary dis-
putes are some of the problems faced by statesmen seeking 
12 
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to establish a successful regional organization. Inspite of 
the various problems among Southeast Asian countries, the 
drive to create a regional organization has been kept alive 
since the 1950s. 
In January 1959, there was an attempt at regional organ-
ization by Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaya, the 
Philippines, South Vietnam and Thailand. The Premier Tunku 
Abdul Rahman sought to unite them under the banner of a 
"Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty" (SEAFET) . 1 
Such an idea did not appeal to the members. In July 1961, 
there was another attempt at regional organization by Malaya, 
the Philippines and Thailand under. the banner of "Association 
of Southeast Asia" (ASA). This also failed, but each of the 
members had alliances with western powers in security matters. 
Malaya was under the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement with 
Great Britain, and the Philippines and Thailand were members 
of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) . 2 The 
third attempt was the creation of MAPHILINDO consisting of 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. 3 
The failure of these regional organizations was due to 
differences in ideology, culture, and political ideas. Never-
theless, inspite of long-standing problems, differences have 
been kept at the lowest level in order to carry out a corrunon 
objective under the umbrella of a successful ASEAN. 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) came 
into existence as a result of the Bangkok Declaration which 
was signed on August 8, 1967. It is a regional organization 
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consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand, with Brunei joining in 1984· 
Observers have argued that ASEAN would be another failed 
regional organization because of various problems among 
its members. Some of the problems are the boundary dispute 
between the Philippines and Malaysia; Indonesia's hostilities 
toward the creation of Malaysia; the mutual fear and suspicion 
of each other; and conflict on views on nationalism and inter-
4 est. Despite these problems among the members, ASEAN has 
survived and at the same time prospered as one of the bright-
est markets in the world. 
ASEAN's suvival has been partly due to the fear of insta-
bility and insecurity that each member has felt since independ-
ence. 
The original motivation behind the formation 
of ASEAN came from a unified effort to minimize 
feelings of insecurity and enhance national inde-
pendence behind Indonesia's President Suharto's 
efforts to create a nonaligned Southeast Asian 
regional organization independent of great power 
domination.5 
Thus, common intere~ts and threats of hostility have 
created a bond among the members. against growing fears of 
communism, especially the Soviet Union. 
Regional cooperation has the best chance of survival 
when there has been an achievement of two. goals: "the maxi-
mum contribution for the obvious economic and other advantages 
of the region, and a maximum of inter-regional political 
neutrality and colorlessness. 116 The avoidance of political 
suspicions and mutual trust is a prerequisite for a successful 
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regional organization. 
From ASEAN's formation until 1975, the performance of 
the organization was disappointing. It has been characterized 
as a loosely-knit community. The corrununist takeover of Indo-
china and the 1973/1974 world economic recession pushed ASEAN 
forward to establish its firm commitment to the fundamental 
principles of cooperation in the economic, social and poli-
tical fields. This led to a need to establish a sense of 
interdependence upon each other, and to increase the group's 
bargaining power in the business world in order to real-
ize economic and political survival in an uncertain future. 
Conseque·ntly, the ASEAN market has been regarded as the bright-
est prospect for international trade and development. ASEAN 
is regarded as the most important and promising effort of 
economic integration sinc8 the formation of the European 
Economic Community. 7 
The United States' interest in ASEAN goes way back, even 
before the creation of ASEAN in 1967. The United States parti-
cipated in the colonization of the Philippines·, was a member 
of the SEATO alliance, and w:as militarily active in th.e Indo-
china conflict. The interest of th.e United States w:as to 
promote democracy,and freedom, to establish markets for raw 
materials and finished products·, and to carry out the 
of containment against communist expansion, es·pecially the 
Soviet Union. The United States was out to win markets, alli-
ances and to promote trade, especially in agricultural goods. 
At the same time, the United States also participated in the 
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promotion of economic development of ASEAN through various 
means, including food aid under P.L. 480 and foreign invest-
ment. Once, the American government under Johnson's adrninis-
tration, tried to use her aid to restrain then ?resident 
Sukarno of Indonesia from carrying out his "Crush Malaysia" 
policy in September 1963. It was in the interest of the United 
States not to use aid as a political weapon against Indonesia, 
as it would increase the popularity of the conununist movement, 
but by increasing aid the United States was able to reduce 
tension in Indonesia. As the political scientist Morgenthau 
once said, "The best political weapon that one state can use 
against the other is economics, as it will soften the minds of 
the receiver. 119 
As a result, the United States has taken a great interest 
in the ASEAN market to the benefit of both the United States 
and the ASEAN. ASEAN has become the fourth largest market for 
the United States' exports. Within the framework of interna-
tional trade and the pursuit of political stability in the 
region, the United States is interested in selling her grains, 
especially wheat, in th.e mark.et. Thus., markets for the agri-
cultural products. are found and, at the same tiroe, .its policy 
of containment against Soviet expansionism in the region is 
carried out. As a whole, the United States seeks to maxi-
mize its power through trade and security in Southeast Asia. 
Not only does the United States seek to maximize its 
' 
power, so do the ASEAN countries. Each nation seeks to sur-
vive and maximize its national interest. ASEAN views the 
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market potential of the United States and the need for Ameri-
can presence in the region to deter the Soviet Union's acti-
vities. As a result, each nation seeks to maximize its own 
national interest by the process of using a psychological 
relationship in which one state is able to control the minds 
and actions of the others. 
Summary 
This chapter seeks to establish the development of 
ASEAN and its interdependent relationsh.ip with the United 
States. Trade and security interest has been the binding 
factor among them, with each seeking to maximize its own 
benefits. As a regional group, ASEAN is able to increase 
its bargaining position with the United States and looks at 
the American market for her exportable goods. It also sees 
the need for American presence in the region to deter the 
Soviet Union's activities. Both ASEAN and the U,S., there-
fore, seek to maximize their trade and security relations. 
The United States is governed ·by the ideology of contain-
ment and constructive eng_agement. Ry containment, the United 
States seeks to deter Soviet expansionism in the r~gion. 
Through trade, the United States seeks· to influence the minds 
and hearts of the ASEAN people. Constructive engagement is 
a tool used by the United States to help build dynamic eco-
nomies, which has been possible through trade relations. 
Chapter III seeks to illustrate the development of the 
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trade between the U.S. and ASEAN since 1967. Specifically, 
it will focus on wheat imports by ASEAN and the implementation 
of P.L. 480 for the economic growth of developing countries. 
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CHAPTER III 
UNITED STATES AND ASEAN TRADE 
DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1967 
Introduction 
Implementing the concept of comparative advantage, 
nations have been engaging in trade for their benefit. 
As such, trade between the U.S. and ASEAN has grown trernen-
dously since 1967. ASEAN has evolved to become the fourth 
largest trading partner of the U.S. as of 1984.
1 
U.S. exports 
to ASEAN totalled $16.9 billion after a two-way trade of 
$26.4 billion and, at the same time, U.S. investments in the 
region by private firms totalled $10 billion in 1983. 2 The 
changing priority in U.S. trade with various regions can be 
seen by changes in its international trade patterns. For ex-
ample, during 1968, U.S. exports to ASEAN were $942 million, 
while South America's was $2.78 billion.
3 
However, ASEAN 
imports from the U.S. by 1983 increased up to $12 billion, 
while South America's was $10.6 billion for the same period. 4 
Evidently, the increase in trade with ASEAN is significant. 
The economic relations of U.S. exports and imports with 
ASEAN, shown in Tables I and II, indicate the amount of 
commodity trade between ASEAN and the U.S. The U.S. has a 
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TABLE I 
UNITED STATES-ASEAN TRADE, 1967-1985 
----"·-·----....... __ .. ~_, _____ 
Exports to the United States 
Calendar .1 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand l\SEAN2 Year Brunei 
·-··-·,.__,....__..,, __ HO··-·--
-----------------------Millions. of U.S. Dollars------------------------------
1967 .335 182.0 195.6 350.7 15.7 
1968 .042 112.7 210. 4 383.3 107.6 
1969 ---- 128.8 246.7 343.6 166.l 
19 70 ---- 144.3 219 4 33. 3 172. 3 
1971 ---- 192.4 208 452.9 207.4 
19 72 14.7 265 237.8 434.2 332 
1973 20.8 465 323 686.7 623 
1974 50.8 1580 595 1133.l 863 
19 75 74.4 1866 612 663.l 746 
19 76 141. 7 2452 826 926.3 965 
1977 148.8 3011 1105 1113.6 1279 
19 78 165.5 2962 1379 1159.l 1626 
1979 210.8 3171 1913 1382.9 1967 
1980 394.6 4303 2119 1593.6 2424 
1981 427.8 4084 1166 1766.8 2770 
1982 199.l 3533 1266 1580.5 2612 
1983 274.4 4266.7 1863.8 2000.8 3961. 0 
1984 90.l 31461.5 1720. 6 2030 .1 3979 
1985 N/A N/l\ N/A N/A N/A 
Source: Department of Commerce, U.S. General Imports, various years 
Note: l. Brunei became a member of ASEAN in 1984, 
2. Total does not include Brunei, except from 1984. 
95.8 759.8 
86.0 900 
105.9 991. l 
95.5 1064.4 
108. 9 1169.6 
136.4 1405.4 
158. 4 2456.1 
193.7 4364.8 














UNITED STATES-ASEAN TRADE, 1967-1985 
-·------···~-··----·-------·· 
Cu.lendu.r 
Imports from the United Ststes 
.1 2 Yeu.r Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ASE AN 
----------------------Mirlions of-1.J.s. Dollars------~-==-=-=-~------------------
1967 3.9 75. 2 54.1 402.3 72 .1 176.4 780.l 
1968 11. 7 123.2 74.4 415. 3 113.6 216.8 943.6 
1969 10.5 15 4. 2 73.8 35 7. 9 161. 5 188.5 935.9 
1970 ---- 178. 5 120.4 354.9 266.2 192.8 1112.8 
1971 35.3 174.1 96.7 330.6 360.l 183.3 1144.8 
1972 20.4 243 144.5 352 .1 476 232.6 1448.2 
1973 23.4 513 205 506.7 778 2 70. 9 2273.6 
1974 37.5 610 397 828.8 1174 424.2 3434.0 
1975 61. 8 670 377 816. 6 1279 471.5 3614.1 
1976 62.5 988 487 876.6 1198 480.8 4020.4 
1977 58.2 777 560 880.7 1324 572 4113. 7 
1978 41. 9 839 824 1079.9 1664 734.8 5141.7 
1979 66.6 1053 1173 1508.2 2527 ll.22.6 7383.8 
1980 114.9 1409 1632 1957.7 3389 1332.4 9720. l 
1981 110.1 1795 1688 1925.6 3484 1296.5 10189.l 
1982 86.8 2076 2141 1865.8 3632 10 41. 7 10756.5 
1983 142 2533.7 2127.3 1788.2 4 261. 6 1295.l 12147.9 
1984 134. 3 3309. 1 2841.9 2753.6 4602.3 1104 16745.2 
1985 N/l\ N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Source: Department of Commerce, U.S. General Exports, .various years 
Note: 1. Brunei became a member of ASEAN in 1984 




trade surplus with ASEAN because ASEAN exports have generally 
been petroleum products, raw materials, and electronics, where-
as imports from the U.S. have generally been agricultural pro-
ducts, technical products and professional services. 
It has been realized that the U.S. has a growing trade 
deficit and Congress has voiced to reduce this imbalance by 
various means, such as engaging in protectionism. However, in 
the case of ASEAN, the U.S. has an advantage, not only in com-
modity trade, but also in her overall foreign policy objectives 
in the region of constructive engagement so aa to carry out 
the containment o~ Soviet expansionism in the region. There-
fore, trade w.i th the community has· a net benefit for the U.S. 
The trade tables seem to support Prebisch's hypothesis 
that developing countries do not benefit from their trade 
relationship with developed nations because, as a group, 
ASEAN has a net deficit with the U.S. However, conclusions 
cannot be drawn from this observation because the tables 
show only the trade balance and not the categories that make 
up the tables. Each nation seeks to maximize its own bene-· 
fit in international trade and seeks to export that product 
in which its has a comparative cost advantage. Therefore, 
Prebisch's hypothesis cannot be supported from observation 
of the data. 
U.S. Wheat Trade with ASEAN 
The ASEAN region has traditionally been a producer and 
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consumer of rice. Unlike rice, which is produced and mostly 
consume·d locally by the majority of the people, wheat is a 
product which is traded internationally. Traditionally, wheat 
products were consumed by Europeans, Arabs and the people of 
northern India. This is no longer true because comsumption 
of wheat products has grown in popularity as a result of chan-
ges in taste, improvement in living standards, and the conven~ 
ience of preparation. 
ASEAN, an area which consumes rice as a major staple food, 
has been increasing its imports of wheat to meet domestic 
demand. This is due to two reasons. First, as a society 
progresses, there will be pressure for quality food products 
su~h as wheat. Second, due to the rice shortage and the high 
price of rice imports, the more appealing cormnodity, wheat, a 
cheaper product, has been viewed as a substitute for rice. As 
a result, rice and wheat products have become interchangeable 
in the diets of ASEAN people. 
Table III shows the wheat trade of ASEAN-since 1967. 
There has been a general upward trend for the import of wheat. 
ASEAN's increasing demand for wheat is due to its inability 
to produce wheat domestically. Wheat imports are generally 
from Australia and the U.S. H.owever, U.S. sales have greatly 
increased because of the high quality of the wheat it sells 
to theASEAN import.tng countries. At the same time, the 
ASEAN imports of U.S. wheat is a sign of goodwill. because of 
the· latter's willingness to import ASEAN products. 
























ASEAN WHEAT TRADE, 1967-1985 
Brui1ei 1. Indonesia _____ 
~ .. --Malaysia--··------J?hI1ippines 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
---------
---------------------------Metric Tons ----------~--------------------------
--- 2152 --- 252136 42275 304196 --- 562484 
40 2365 . . 530366 23329 388370 --- 615 414 
--- 2522 --- 438460 6606 324472 585920 
--- 2565 --- 466735 14911 349822 --- 50 76 89 
108 3006 712987 4575 32 7922 --- 611159 
99 2893 --- 501257 7800 404945 1 761261 
94 2902 --- 880601 98017 429553 --- 531771 
115 2717 --- 784001 10682 421152 1 517362 
--- 3295 6495 730021 12233 306618 --- 541488 
--- 3775 3 980683 6413 432898 1 722294 
--- 3422 --- 810049 7377 503097 --- 670537 
111 1328 4167 843545 14910 528736 --- 687793 
22 4542 5416 807303 9742 503364 --- 732193 
7 2989 --- 1488121 15526 487634 --- 798428 
4 4131 ... 1420880 --- 30386 503397 1 874603 
--- 7140 ... 1489420 --- 33150 54 3080 --- 942715 
--- 6950 1756760 13890 551390 --- 870750 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 


























TABLE III {CONTINUED) 
Singapore Thailand ·-----·---·-ASEAN2-. --
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
---------------------Metric Tons-----------------------:...~=-~-------.~----- -------
55990 212142 15915 58156 114180 1389114 
41404 294673 18439 58423 83172 1887246 
51732 252227 18345 64449 76683 1665528 
97405 277739 2991 80665 115307 1682650 
95676 178976 2060 63706 102311 1894750 
577.71 182652 2274 96753 67846 1946868 
117163 235728 5007 90574 220187 2168227 
121068 187318 2512 97087 134262 2006920 
96837 214057 328 62119 116343 1854303 
65683 16275 7 83 134262 72183 2435097 
154338 341294 681 89709 16 2 39 6 2414686 
206209 268381 2322 128076 227608 2456531 
279147 407317 4293 168676 298598 2618855 
257901 379697 5089 211547 278516 3365427 
250518 347656 5638 203936 286543 3290472 
86846 212050 4862 132303 214858 3319 56 8 
57680 207070 18060 221210 89630 3547180 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
FAO Trade Yearbook, various years 




within ASEAN, but the artificial method of production would 
cost more to produce than to import. Moreover, it is not 
feasible to produce through laboratory methods because there 
are areas in the world in which land still has not been put 
to cultivation. Thus, wheat has a great potential in the 
ASEAN market, especially the United States' wheat, which is 
of a very high quality, even though faced by average quality 
imports from Australia. 
Table IV shows the role of the United States' wheat 
exports into ASEAN. American wheat exporters must realize 
that there are many competitors trying to get a share 
of the ASEAN wheat market. Not all the years show an upward 
trend. For example, duri~g 1982, Singapore greatly reduced 
her imports from the U.S. because of re-exports by Malaysia. 5 
Overall, the region shows that wheat imports from the U.S. 
since 1967 ~ave increased, although Australia has an advan-
tage. Even Malaysia, which was once a strong importer of 
wheat from Australia, .has, since the late 1970s, .increased 
her wheat imports from the United States. 
The w.eak performance by U.S. wheat in Malaysia and Singa-
pore until the middle 1970s is due to the failure of the U.S. 
to recognize. gro"fdi~g mark.et potential. For example, .Sing_apore, 
with. a population of 2. 5 million peOple, .cannot be viewed as 
a small market, .hut rather should be viewed within the ASEAN 
framework as a whole. Secondly, .the U.S. concentrated her 
exports primarily to the Philippines while neglecting the po-
TABLE IV 
ASEAN WHEAT IMPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES, 1967-1985 
Calendar l ----·-----· 
Year Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore 'l'hailand ASEAN
2 
----------------------------------Metric Tons---------------------------------
1967 --- 2151 8539 508204 9613 . 9367 537874 
1968 --- 110625 5694 588336 14469 9252 728376 
1969 --- 186707 4866 464127 21838 8535 686073 
1970 --- 353599 9869 5016 39 15450 13713 894270 
1971 --- 212763 5020 360440 211763 33288 824274 
1972 --- 321775 2991 503941 5992 22978 857657 
1973 --- 568699 16725 418816 49604 25196 1079040 
1974 --- 38255 18215 379007 16 ,35 43402 450514 
1975 --- 330717 6453 365690 35445 55636 793941 
1976 --- 364768 17181 452754 41897 83840 960441 
19 77. --- 456696 39244 406154 47560 51530 1001184 
1978 --- 536007 56413 746198 49747 6612 1390537 
1979 --- 597743 48378 904483 77004 98417 17260 25 
1980 --- 78914 8 84370 767989 59135 7 3 7 3·2 1774354 
1981 --- 724164 120665 8515 45 118598 12 76 3 2 1942594 
1982 --- 968651 129752 923170 11040 84699 2117312 
1983 --- 959753 140074 854015 19778 131831 2105451 
1984 --- 817392 98214 719070 21270 88977 1756023 
1985 --- N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Source: Department of Commerce, U.S. General Exports, various years 
Note: 1. Brunei became a member of ASEAN in 1984. 




tential of other ASEAN markets. It was not until the late 
1970s that the U.S. established a U.S. Wheat Associate Office 
and the U.S. Agricultural Trade Office in Singapore in order 
to realize the benefit of trade with the region. By then, 
Australia had made inroads into the market for wheat products 
in ASEAN. 
Third, ASEAN is very cautious about the reliability of 
U.S. supplies. For example, during 1973-74, Indonesia was hav-
ing production shortfalls in her agricultural products and, 
thus, requested economic aid from the U.S. However, instead 
of supplying Indonesia where there was the greatest need, 
the U.S. used wheat as a political weapon in order to 
support and maintain regimes in South Korea, South Vietnam 
6 
and Kampuchea in power, while foregoing Indonesia. As a result 
of this action, .Indonesia's immediate purchase fell from about 
60 percent to 5 percent U.S. wheat. However, over the period 
of time, the U.S. has been able to r~gain her lost market 
share in ASEAN. 
Fourth , the earlier performance of U.S. wheat in Malay-
sia and Si!lgapore was due to the fact that these two nations 
were generally trading within the Bristish Commonwealth mar-
kets. Such trading practice benefits Australia, especially 
in wheat aalea. There is a need ~or the U.S. to recognize, 
adopt and cha!lge her tr.ad~<;J practice in order to find new 
markets.. The world that we live in today is highly competi-
tive and a nation needs to take this view into account when 
trading with other nations. The competitive market is .very 
30 
true for wheat products which are traded internationally. In 
ASEAN, the U.S. is challenged by Australian wheat products 
which have a transportation cost advantage. Moreover, Austral-
ia's additional advantage is the old colonial relationship 
with the region. 
One major factor that the United States has over her 
wheat competitors is the high quality of her product 
availability of credit and, most importantly, the technical 
assistance provided in wheat handling. 7 For example, the 
United States has established the foreign office of the Wheat 
Association in Singapore and the Philippines, with the Singa-
pore office playing a larger role in promoting wheat in ASEAN. 
In addition, a United States. Agricultural Trade Office has 
been established in Singapore to serve the American agricul-
tural interests in ASEAN. The basic objectives of these two 
U.S. agricultural offices in Singapore is to promote agricul-
tural products, ,particularly wheat products. This is possible 
thro~gh the provision of professional technical personnel from 
the United States, along with local expertise employed by 
the wheat association. 8 At times, even the government takes 
significant interest in promoting the use of wheat by shift~ 
ing the. demand from rice to wheat due to the -~uality and the 
availability of wheat. 9 
The United States' interes_t in promoting and exporting 
wheat to ASEAN is due to the la!ge population of ASEAN (about 
280 million). At the same time, due to the improvement in 
livi~g standards and urbanization, there is a tendency for 
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the people to complement and, to a certain extent, substitute 
wheat for rice. Tourists visiting ASEAN countries also 
caused the promotion and the import of quality wheat. This 
is especially true for Singapore where the tourist trade ge-
nerates considerable reveune for the country. In order to 
meet the demands of the tourists, Singapore has to import 
quality wheat and wheat-products. All these work to the ad-
vantage of the United States because of the high quality of 
its wheat. The media also helps in the promotion of wheat 
products, and advertisements have become effective means of 
selling wheat products. Besides these factprs, not all the 
ASEAN population consumes rice as their major staple food. 
Descendants from northern India and Europe in ASEAN tend to 
prefer wheat products to rice. Even in certain parts of 
the Philippines and Indonesia, some people eat little or ·· 
no rice at a11.
10 
However, the prospects for an increase in the United 
States wheat exports depends upon the economic health of the 
ASEAN community. The current debt problem in the Philippines 
and Indonesia may cause these nations to reduce foreign 
purchases. Indonesia and, in fact, several other ASEAN coun-
tries are becoming very price-conscious· when importing wheat. 
Indonesia ia ;f;acing revenue cuta -~rom falli?g oil prices. 
The debt prohlem :i;or the developing countries can cause 
nations to purchase less of American farm products, and 
particularly wheat. 
11 
However, _the debt problem has not 
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caused any major substitutions of the high quality United 
States wheat for other average quality wheat. The prospects 
for the American wheat trade remains good in ASEAN. 
About 60 percent of the United States' wheat harvest 
. d h t . 12 is exporte to ot er coun ries. The United States is 
faced domestically by an abundant wheat surplus and has to 
get rid of her wheat because of high storage costs. For the 
past 50 years, the American government's support of higher 
farm prices has focused the wheat policy upon "Supply 
Management and Demand Development. 1113 Programs are developed 
in which credit is made available to farmers who store their 
wheat until the price is high or to sell under support prices 
to the government. 14 This led to a gradual· increase in U.S. 
wheat surplus. This commodity oversupply causes the govern-
ment to donate to other countries because of high storage 
costs. Therefore, the Unied States is forced, due to the 
cost of storage, to promote the development of "food aid" 
programs which are aimed at disposi~g of the accumulated wheat, 
rice, and other_ grain products through concessional sales to 
needy countries. 15 
Conse~uently, .the promo.tion of American wheat in 
ASEAN is_ great because of availability. The United States has 
an advantage over her competitors because of the high quality 
of her w.he.at. At the same time,: _in Indonesia and Thailand, 
there has. been s.pecial attention_ g_iveri to increase per capita 
consumption thr.o"!-lgh promotion becaus.e ·wheat flour usage is 
s.till very low:. 16 Taste and improvement in living standards 
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cause an increase in wheat consumption and wheat imports. 
Indonesia shows the greatest potential for the United States' 
wheat imports because of the s.ize of the population. About 
70 percent of the wheat imports by Indonesia is from the 
United States. 
Although U.S. wheat products have made inroads into the 
ASEAN markets, there is still great potential for demand in 
the region. This, therefore, calls for strong promotional 
efforts. With the ability of Australia to supply wheat pro-
ducts at a cheaper rate due to transportation cost advantage, 
the trade off ices in Singapore have been establishing market 
recognition of the high quality U.S. wheat products relative 
to its high price. This is possible by engaging in vario~s 
food promotion strategies such as the highly successful stra-
tegy in attracting consumers in Singapore under the banner 
II f . 1117 A Taste o America. With the success in Singapore, the 
promotional strategy was carried out with success in other 
ASEAN markets. 
Besides promotions such as the banner strategy of 
"A Taste of America," U.S. wheat products have also been 
shown in various trade exhibitions in ASEAN ci.ties. For. ex-
ample, _the "Food and Hotel Asia" exhibition in· 1982 and 1984 
in Singapore was used as a tool for the promotional process. 18 
Advertisements., .menu promotions of u. s. wheat products in 
restaurants. and hotels., _the knocking down of tariff barriers 
such as the high quality control of ~gricultural imports by 
34 
the Singapore government and the tas:te of the consumers' pre-
ferences are important implications for the promotion of U.S. 
wheat products in ASEAN.
19 
Besides the various promotional strategies·, there are 
other ways in which the U.S. has been able to promote her 
wheat in ASEAN. The P.L. 480 programs have been the founda-
tion upon which the U.S. promotes her wheat. The provision 
of technical assistance in wheat handling is yet another 
technique. Baking·schools have been established in order to 
increase flour usage. By being an export base region, 
Singapore has been able to establish highly succesful noodle 
factories. 
The wheat trade between the U.S. and ASEAN has resulted 
in ASEAN dependence on tl:ie U.S. This seems to support Pre-
bisch's hypothesis which says that developing countries do 
not benefit from trade with developing countries. However, 
conclusions cannot be drawn from this observation, and so we 
are able to reject Preb.isch's hypothesis, because ASEAN 
still benefits in its wh.eat trade with the U.S. ASEAN"s bene-
fits lie: in the changing taste preferences of its peoples 
and the availability of U.S. wheat and wheat technology to 
the region. At the same time, the U.S. has been able to car-
ry out her foreign policy objective of constructive engagement 
in her trade relations with ASEAN. The U.S. has been able to 
maximize her interest by the ability to influence the minds 
and actions.of the ASEAN people through her wheat sales while 
also getting rid of her surplus grains. 
35 
Due to these, the U.S. has been gaining sales momentum of 
about 56 percent of the ASEAN wheat imports as of 1983. How-
ever, the highly successful wheat share in the ASEAN markets 
could be lost, especially if there are trade protectionism 
measures against ASEAN products in the U.S. 
Projected Wheat Requirements 
by ASEAN by 1990 
There has been much mention about the wheat trade in 
ASEAN. This region is basically a consumer and producer of 
rice and has to import wheat to meet domestic demand. There 
will be an increase in wheat imports by ASEAN, especially 
from the u.s~, due to the high quality of the product and also 
as a sign of goodwill resulting from U.S. wi.lli!lgness to pur-
chase imports from these nati.ons. H.owever, .thi.s: can cha!lge 
i~ there are protectionist measures ~gainst ASEAN imports be-
cause the U.S. wheat must remain competitive, especially from 
Australia. 
Tables V and VI show. the projected requirements of wheat 
by ASEAN. ASEAN has to import wheat to meet domestic demands 
because of low rice supplies and the high cost of rice imports. 
Although rice is the most important cereal staple, people in 
Singapore and Malaysia prefer wheat to rice because of their 
changed tastes. With the exception of Thailand, ASEAN nations 
need to meet up to 40 percent of their food requirements with 
wheat, if they were to make do with the available rice sup-
h 'd d't 20 Th t t plies and not import t e sai commo i y. e grea es 
TABLE Y 





































Source: Adapted from Rodhey Tyers, "Food Security in ASEAN" 
in U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
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increase in wheat imports will be in Indonesia because of the 
large population and ·the government policies. The Indonesian 
government has provided to wheat importers subsidies so as to 
reduce the price charged to consumers. 21 This increases the 
demand by consumers at the expense of government revenue. The 
purpose is to reduce the demand upon expensive rice imports 
and, at the s.ame time, to increase the use of wheat from the 
United States, .which have been obtained from concessional 
sales or ~rom P.L. 480 pr~grams. In degree of importance, 
Singapore will undertake changes because of equal importance 
of wh.eat with. rice. ~oreover, _due to urbanization, advertise-
ment influence, .and the_ greater availability of wheat products, 
conaumers in Singapore have, over the .peri.od of time, Qegan 
to substitute. wheat products for rice. Als.o, .noodles made 
from wheat have become an increasingly important meal item 
among Singapore hous.eholds. 
Even tho~gh the prospect of wheat imports into ASEAN is 
. good, .the U.S. Agricultural Trade Office in Singapore has to 
. gear up a promotional campa~gn in order- to sell wheat to 
the domestic population~·. in ASEAN. American wheat has to re-
main competitive against other wheat exporters, particularly 
Australia, in order to maintain a dominant role as a supplier 
in the ASEAN markets. 
Public Law 480 
Public Law 480 or Food for Peace is a specialized form 
of foreign economic aid. The nature of the food aid is that 
40 
it involves a donor country, that is, a country with excess 
supply, which sells on a concessional basis or gives as a gift 
to a food deficient country. This is to relieve the shortage 
of food in the recipient country and, at the same time, encou-
rage economic development. 
P.L. 480 is the U.S. version of the overall world com-
munity's effort to help food deficient countries. Other ac-
tive parties are the European Economic Community and Japan. 
Even though the role of the U.S. in food aid has diminished 
since the 1950 s, _nevertheless, the U.S. still is regarded as 
the largest supporter. 
Since the f orma ti on of food aid prs»grams, the concept 
has ch.~ged .over a period of 7Cl years.. }food aid w.as £:irst 
used as a we.apon o;e w.ar;. next, it w.as seen as a humanitarian 
. gesture to starvi~g people ca~ght in the aftermath of war; 
next, as a political weapon to minimize unrest; then, as a 
means of disposing of unwanted food surpluses, and then, as 
a resource for the support of economic development elsewhere. 22 
However, since 1971, with introduction of more strict terms on 
concessional sales of food which. has· .ceduced the volume of 
food aid sales, there has been a change in tlie emphasis of 
food aid policy from sales to grants of food aid. 23 With the 
introduction of the "Humphrey Amendment" to P.L. 480 in 1974, 
food aid was distributed for pumanitarian purposes. 24 
Various types of products are shipped under P.L. 480; 
for example, rice, wheat, corn, etc., However, the major 
portion of shipment is wheat because of abundance in supply 
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and, at the same time, its potential for the promotion of 
future wheat sales. P.L. 480 further fosters the foreign 
po~icy objectives of the United States. There are two major 
titles under which P.L. 480 is given to recipient countries. 
Under Title I, the "recipient government buys U.S. food on 
credit subsidized by the U.S. government, with the interest 
rate and payment terms negotiated separately in each bilateral 
1 . ..2s sa es agreement. Title I makes up about 70 percent of the 
food aid programs. and repayment period could be up to 40 
26 years. There are various ways in which the recipient govern-
ment could make the. food available to their people, such as 
through_ government subsidized prices or other types· of govern-
mental as.s.is.tance pr~grams.. Under. the oth:er title, .which is 
Title I.I., "the U.S. government donates; food directly. to the 
other country, .through the food and agricultural agencies. . . - . . 
like CARE, .which_ goes: directly to recipients in school feed-
i~g pr~grams, eme~gency or famine relief, .and food-for-work 
development projects. 1127 
ASEAN, .like any other developing nations, have been reci-
. pients. of food aid, _particularly wheat, .under P.L. 480 from 
the U.S. Table VII shows th.e Title I of P.L. 480 since 1967, 
which is basically credit sales under low interest rates. The 
only major recipient under Title I is Indonesia, with Thai-
land and the Philippines receiving only in 1972 and 1978, 
repectively. Indonesia has been receiving food aid, especial-
ly in the form of wheat, every year since 1967, except during 
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U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Food for Peace Program, various years. 
43 
administration of food aid. 
Table VIII shows the total wheat and wheat products 
shipped to ASEAN under Title II since 1967. These are basic-
ally direct donation~ of food from the U.S. Wheat under Title 
II reached an all-time high in 198Q because of an influx of 
refugees from Indo:ahina. Generally, there has been a decline 
in the amount of wheat products shipped to ASEAN since 1975, 
except from 1982 when there was a SQ .percent increase as a 
result of an increase in school ~eedin9 programs in the Philip-. . 
pines. 
Tab.le IX show.s the numb.er of recipients within ASEAN. 
The food that is_ given to recipients are_ generally for maternal 
chi.ld feeding-, school ~e.edi.ng, ~o.od ;!!or work, emergency, and 
. genera.l welfare. Since 1967, all the ASEAN members (except 
Bruneil wer·e recipients, .but since 19_78 every ASEAN nation 
exc~pt the Philippines and Indonesia has been "disqualified." 
The basic objective of the U.S. under P.L. 480 is for the 
promotion of her wheat, donation for humanitarian reasons 
and for economic development of the countries. Through the 
use of food aid, groundwork is laid for future wheat product 
sa~es. There are various ways in which the U.S. can channel 
her food aid, either directly between government to government 
or indirectly through voluntary agencies. Some of the volun-
tary organizations that are playing an important role in dis-
tributing food in ASEAN are Catholic Relief Services (CRS), 






















TOTAL WHEAT AND WHEAT PRODUCTS SHIPPED TO ASEAN 
UNDER TITLE II OF PUBLIC LAW 480, 
1967 - 1985 
Brunei 1 Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore 'rhailand ASEAN 2 
--------------------In Metric Tons -~---~-----------------------------
--- 574 ·-.--- ---- -- --- 574 
--- 6154 ---- ---- --. --- 615 4 
--- 8385 8270 1424 20 --- 15099 
--- 177412 4606 5706 126 --- 187850 
--- 44399 4541 20379 37 --- 69356 
--- 42392 1647 17912 51 --- 62002 
--- 49071 2882 35l22 31 --- 87106 
--- 32976 426 29130 150 --- 62682 
--- 3950 162 11237 165 --- 15514 
--- 3610 ---- 10748 201 --- 14559 
--- 110 75 ---- 13128 147 --- 24 350 
--- 29483 ---- 20094 --- --- 29577 
--- 14236 ---- 21933 136 --- 36305 
--- 21172 ---- 17382 --- --- 38554 
14 745 21533 
.. 36278 --- ---- --- ---
--- 11798 ---- 52106 --- --- 36 814 
--- 11286 ---- 13000 --- --- 242 86 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
-·--
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food for Peace Program, various years. 
Notes: l. Brunei became a member of ASEAN in 1984. 




TITLE II - PUBLIC LAW 480 - NUMBER OF 
RECIPIENTS WITH ASEAN BY PROGRAM TYPE 
1967-1985 
Calenaar Total I Food for developmt::11" Emer;,\ency I Wei. fare 
Year Country HaternallSchoollOther IFoodlRefugeslDisasteri(general 
Child Feed- Child for I I I relief) 

































































































































NIA II/A II/A 
NIA N/A N/A 
83500 620780 35000 
1220 240065 











































































TABLE IX (CONTINUED) 




Child Feed- Child for i relief 
Feedin in .FeedinglWork1 I 
1975 Indonesia 2184500 331200 159100 24000 1670200 
Malaysia 151500 151500 
Philippines 1731800 500000 900000 329800 2000 
Singapore 47600 47600 
1976 Indonesia 718900 388800 ---128100 202000 ---
Philippines 1574600 730000 707500 20000 23900 29000 64200 
Singapore 37600 37600 
1977 Indonesia 589800 348700 6100 235000 
Philippines 2423600 700000 707500 56000 40100 920000 
Singapore 37600 37600 
1978 Indonesia 746100 332100 4000 350000 53000 7000 
Philippines 2608900 1484900 760000 49000 300000 1500C 
1979 Indonesia 781600 338800 100 234500 200000 820( 
Philippines 2970300 671400 2228500 32200 36200 200( 
1980 Indonesia 642000 107000 - 245700 165300 120000 400( 
Philippines 3068100 804500 2200000 27300 311300 200( 
1981 Indonesia 773200 410000 - 357700 55or 
Philippines 3077900 812500 2200000 22100 23800 1950C 
1982 Indonesia 965100 115000 - 269900 580200 
Philippines 2288050 1006800 1256000 20250 5000 
1983 Indonesia 521100 112500 2711500 84100 50000 
Philippines 2241800 509300 1530000 202500 
1984 ASE.AN NIA N/A N/A ti/A N/A N/A ti/A N/A 
1985 ASEAN N/A N/A N/A N/A NIA ti/A N/A ti/A 
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Program (WFP), and the United Nations International Children's 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF), to name a few. 
Frorru.the 1960s to the 1970 enactment of the Humphrey 
Amendment, P.L. 480 has been used not only for the economic 
development of countries, but also as the U.S. government's 
political weapon; it was given to "client" states to maintain 
the r~gime in power against any popular uprising. For example, 
duri~g 19.73, Cambodia, South Vietnam and South Korea received 
67 percent of all Title I aid, .whi.le I.ndonesia, where there 
28 was an urgent need, received only 8 percent. Also, duri~g 
1963, under the· Johnson Admini~rtration, the food aid was ini-
tiated as a political ins.trumen t ~gainst Sukarno's "Crush 
Malay·sia" policy. 
29 
In the case of Sukarno, .the U.S. believed 
that by increasing aid, .tension could be reduced :in Indonesia. 
This is part of the U.S. fore:Lgn policy of constructive en-
gagement which seeks to increase instead of reduce aid to a 
regime so as to influence political reform through economics. 
Thus, the policy of sodtening the minds: of the receivers is 
achieved. 
As such, P.L. 480 seems to support the common view among 
Third World nations that trade relations benefit the U.S. 
and serves American interests at the expense of developing 
countries. However, even though the P.L. 480 program empha-
sizes the U.S. foreign policy objective of constructive 
engagement, it has"benefitted ASEAN in terms of economic de-
velopment and has also helped in bringing political stability 
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to the region. 
Overall, the Food for Peace program has helped in the 
economic development of ASEAN and also has created a market 
for future' exports of U.S. wheat and wheat proc:ducts. Living 
standards have improved, nourishment intake has increased 
in school children, and life expectancy has grown in ASEAN 
since 196 7. 
Summary 
This chapter shows the development of U.S. and ASEAN 
trade since 1967. It shows that both of them has benefitted 
in their trade relationship. Prebisch's hypothesis that 
developing countries do not benefit in their trade relations 
with developed countries cannot be accepted because ASEAN has 
been able to maximize its b.ene:eits. from quality wheat imports, 
the ·technical provision that comes along with. wheat handli~g, 
and concessional sales. As for the U.S., it has also bene-
fitted from through l} the implementation of its constructive 
engagement policy in ASEAN, 2) the increase in wheat sales, 
and 3) the establishment of U .s. political inter.est in the 
region. As such, the U,S, constructive engagement policy has 
set the ground for the achievement of the second u~s. foreign 
policy objective of containment of Soviet activities in the 
region. Chapter v will show the development of U.S. security 
interests in ASEAN vis-a-vis the challe~ges posed by the Sov-
iet Union and China, its use of military installations in the 
Philippines, and reactions toward attempts at regional neut-
rality. 
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CHAPTER IV 
UNITED STATES POLITICAL INTEREST 
IN ASEAN 
Introduction 
The ASEAN states, except for Thailand, have been former 
colonies or protectorates of Western powers such as Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. Brunei, 
Malaysia and Singapore were under the guidance· ·of ·the Brit-
ish.. Indonesia was under the influence of the Dutch, and · 
the Philippines, under the guidance of the Americans. 
By January 1984, all the member states had regained full 
. t 1 sovereign y. 
The Western powers' contest in the ASEAN region was for 
the establishment of markets where they could trade and search 
for raw materials. Political scientist Alfred Thayer Mahan 
analyzed sea power as an important element in national power. 
He wrote, "Those·who rule the seaways rule the world." 2 
G~ea t B:r:i tain, which was a'ble to control the· major straits, 
e?pecially the Straits of Malacca at.Sing~pore, was able 
to oversee trade·, communication, and the provision of secu-
rity in.the region. The works of Mahan later influenced· 
the development of the United States as· a sea power as well. 
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The U.S. today is regarded a~ the sea power, instead of 
Great Britain, in the ASEAN region. 
Mahan's contemporary scholar, Sir Halford Mackinder, 
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had a different perspective. He discussed the.relation. of 
technology and. geography. Mackinder viewed the idea of a land 
mass which he called as the Heartland. He envisioned the idea 
of a Heartland in which those who ruled the. land mass of Eur-
asia ruled the world. 3 He envisioned the Soviet Union as a 
great power on land. Traditionally, the Soviet Union has been 
a. great land power, whereas the U.S. has been a sea power. But 
with the improvement in technology, the Soviet Union has also 
been able to become another sea power. This can be seen in 
Southeast Asia, where, over the past five years, Soviet 
naval activity has expanded to the South China Sea .• 
To counterbalance Mackinder's Heartland Theory, some 
scholars such as Nicholas J. Spykman and Stephen B. Jones 
suggested the idea of a "rimland" to contain the Soviet 
U . 4 Ill.On. This idea is based upon the concept that those who 
control the rimland around the Eurasian continent rule the 
world. The "rimland" concept motivated the United States 
after the second world war to advocate the idea of the 
containment of the Soviet Union. The policy of containment 
put forward by .American statesman George F. Kennan became 
the ideolog:y· for the U.S. foreign policy of internationalism. 5 
Therefore, nations began to look at the sea as a fron-
tier of mankind in which both the U.S. and the u.s.S.R. are 
flexing their muscles. As such, Southeast Asia has become a 
stage for the rivalry between the two superpowers for the 
maintenance of the balance of power. 
United States Interest 
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The role that the U.S. plays in the world is not only 
economic--the establishment of markets for its products and 
to undertake economic development of the Third World--but 
also a political one--the establishment of military bases 
and alliances and the promotion of democracy. It has been 
through the use of economics that the U.S. has been able to 
promote its political views in a loose bipolar world. In 
order for any relationship or alliance to be effective, there 
must be a meeting of minds between the parties. 
At the end of World War II, the U.S. was r~garded as a 
leader in economic power. But today, this is no longer true. 
The U.S. has reduced her economic power because there are 
other economic agents, notably Japan, that are able to deliver 
the same technology or guidance to the Third World. As such, 
in order to win confidence of the ASEAN members, the U.S. has 
to assure these countries of its_ genuine interest in the region. 
The U.S. has a strategic, ideol~gical and political interest 
in ASEAN. The ASEAN members even assume that the U.S. is only 
pursui~g its interest in the region because every action that 
is undertaken by it is viewed by the ASEAN countries as just 
promoting American interests. 
In strat~gic and political terms, .there are four_ great 
powers that contend in the ASEAN r~gion, namely, China, Japan, 
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the Soviet Union, and the U.S. aowever, in the global con-
frontation, it is between the U.S. and .the Soviet Union. 
The confrontation between th.em is not played out directly 
in the r~gion, but elements of the confrontation are present. 6 
Thus, the oalance of power game is established. At the same 
time, the alliance has moved from a tight bipolar region im-
mediately after World War II, to a loose bipolar region with 
alliances falling under either the Soviet Union camp of the 
United States camp. 
Since the withdrawal of the British forces from Singapore 
in 1971, a vacuum has been created in the see.urity of South-
east Asia. The U.S. began to fill the vacuum so as to main-
tain the balance of power game. In the ASEAN region, the U.S. 
pursues a policy of constructive engagement through the rule 
of economics; that is, by the provision of investment, aid 
and trade, the U.S. is hopeful in establishing democratic 
. government which will be supportive of U.S. interests. The 
U.S. has been successful in using trade and aid in the 
development of ASEAN. For example, in 1963, the U.S. was able 
to reduce tension in Indonesia not by reducing aid so as to 
force then President Sukarno of Indonesia to drop his 
policy of "konfrontasi." By increasi~g aid, the United States 
reduced the popularity of the communist movement and also 
. d . d 1 . 7 reduced tens.ion between In onesia an Ma aysia. 
The other o:O.jective of the U.S. in the ASEAN region be-
sides constructive erig~gement is the policy of containment of 
the Soviet Union's expansionism. This involves an establish-
8 
merit of industrial powers along the rimland. ASEAN 
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forms part of that rimland or crescent, and good relations 
with the ASEAN go\Ternments is a necess.i ty· in maintaining· 
the balance of power. Containment of the Soviet Union is 
deemed necessary although it could not possible become so 
dominant as to exclude the U.S. from the region; the Soviet 
Union, however, has the ability to protect military power 
through its expanding naval presence in the Pacific. 
Besides the objective of constructive engagement and 
containment, a third factor that necessitates U.S. interest 
is the location of ASEAN. The location of ASEAN is along the 
world's busiest shipping lanes, namely, the Straits of Malac-
ca (See Figure 1). The increase in tonnage of vessels has 
underscored the need for a deep waterway; over time, the 
Straits of Sunda between the Indonesian islands of Java and 
Sumatra have become equally important. 
In the light of economic and military function, these 
straits have become importa11t for the U.S. in the facilitation 
of commerce and also for the movement of the U.S. Seventh 
Fleet from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. If there 
was to be a restriction of access along the Straits of Malac-
ca, especially, .there could be serious economic implications 
for the U.S. and Japan. 
Again, .l?rebisch' _s vie't>lis about the Third World being 
exploited cannot be held valid. Here, the U.S. is in need 
of the strategic location of ASEAN for commerce and security 
United States Essential 
Foreign Trade Routes 
Source: U. S . House , Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
The Sovi e t Union in the Third World, 
1980-1985: An Imperial Burden or 
Political Asset? (1985) . 
Figure 1. United States Essential Foreign Trade Routes 
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reasons. Therefore, the U.S. needs the ASEAN countries for 
counterbalancing the Soviet Union. Even ASEAN expects every 
move that the U.S. undertakes as promoting American interest. 
Through increase in trade relations, the U.S. has successful-
ly influenced the minds and actions of the ASEAN people. As 
a whole, the presence of the U.S. both militarily and econo-
mically helps the economic and political development of ASEAN. 
Therefore, both the U.S. and ASEAN benefit from the interde-
pendent relationship. 
Freedom of passage along the straits is of utmost impor.;.. 
tance to Japan, in particular, because the straits serve as an 
economic lifeline for the development of Japan. All the 
Middle East oil and reaources flow thro~gh these straits. 
At the same time, the Strai.ts of Malacca serve as the major 
export route to markets and any b.lockage or un;f;riendly actions, 
such as expanding Soviet Union activities:, .could cause eco-
nomic disaster for Japan. For the u .$., .the Btrai ts of Ma-
lacca serves as the primary route for the U.S. Seventh Fleet's 
.movement between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. 
Therefore, the Straits of Malacca serves as an instrument for 
an overall containment policy of the U.S. against the Soviet 
Union interest in the region. The principal guarantee to 
free access to these strategic waters--and containment of 
the Soviets--for the U.S. Is good relations with the ASEAN 
governments. 
Since the establishment of U.S. presence in Southeast 
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Asia by the SEATO alliance, the Soviet Union has accused the 
U.S. of transforming the "dead" SEATO into ASEAN so as to ful-
fill its policy of containment. 9 As a result, the U.S.-ASEAN 
relationship has evolved into two forms: (1) a group of 
countries allied with the U.S. by treaty; (2) hon-Communist 
countries that are not allied with the U.S., but support 
its objectives and are essentially friendly with it.
10 
The first group consists of countries within ASEAN that 
have military treaties with the U.S. Both the Philippines 
and Thailand have explicit military protection under the 
Manila Pact with the U.S. against fore~gn invasion. 12 Due to 
this agreement, the U. s. maintains military bases· in the Phi-
lippines and has defense treaties with Thailand and the Philip-
pines. American military bases such as Clark Air Base and 
Subic Naval B.as.e--are important in that they will play major 
supportive roles. in times of aggression hy. the S.oviet Union, 
either agains:t th.e ·AsEAN states or against U .s. interests . 12 
The second ·group comprise ·the countries of Brunei, .Indo-
nesia, .Malaysia and Si~gapore. By the presence of U.S. mili-
tary in the region and treaty obligations with Thailand and 
the Philippines·, the United States, consequently, has implictly 
guaranteed the freedom of these countries. Such gratitude 
protects ASEAN against forei.gn aggression, especially the 
Soviet Union. Such action, thus, legitimizes the presence of 
the U.S. in the region. 13 At the same time, Malaysia and Sin-
gapore are members under the Five Power Defense Plan. 14 This 
five power plan is commonly known as ANZUK in which the secu-
rity of Malaysia and Singapore is guaranteed by Australia, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom as a_ condition for the 
withdrawal of British forces from Singapore in 1971. 
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Overall, ASEAN is both directly and indirectly linked 
to the U.S. security alliance. Directly two of .its members 
--Thailand and the Philippines--are under the protection of 
the Manila Pact. Indireactly, Malaysia and Singapore are 
. guarded by Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom in 
which the latter three countries has military treaties with 
the U.S. such as ANZUS for Australia and New Zealand, and 
NATO for the United Kingdom. Therefore, the ASEAN nations 
are protected against foreign invasion by the U.S. At the 
same time, the U.S. military vessels are. guaranteed free 
access along the Strait of Malacca, a freedom which has been 
denied to the Soviet Union. 
The u. S.. has, theref:ore, .a poli.tical as. w.el.l as: an .ideo-
logical in tereS:t in ASEAN because ·of al·liance, .demo·cra tic 
government, _and the ·commitment to economic growth and develop-
ment thro~gh major private enterprises. The economic develop-
ment success of ASEAN is of_ great interest for U.S. stability 
in the region amd also for future U.S. exports of goods and 
services. Within international trade, the U.S. seeks to pro-
mote her agricultural products, especially wheat, to these 
nations .. 
P.L. 480 has served as the foundation of U.S. foreign 
policy. At time, .the U.S. has- tried to use P.L. 480 as a 
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political weapon. For example, Indonesia was undergoing 
major turmoil in 1963 when the communist movement was also 
gaining wide acceptance. This was also associated with 
Sukarno's "Crush Malaysia" policy. The Johnson administration 
was initially prepared to use P.L. 480 against Pres. Sukarno 
by reducing the level of aid. However, such an action would 
not have been in the best interest of the U.S. because it 
would increase the popularity of the communist movement. 
~ncreased aid from the United States government, to a certain 
extent, did help to reduce tension in the ASEAN region. Such 
move thus secures the U.S. political interest in the region. 
The United States needs to continue fostering goodwill 
wi.th the ASEAN government and, _at the same time, counter 
Soviet Union activities to :temain dominant in the region. 
This \trould, .in the long run, benefit the .U.S., .both militarily 
and- economically because all access to market and lane-s of 
cornro.unication are available to the U.s·., bl.it deni.ed the S.oviet 
Union. Therefore, the U.S. has the ·aoility to maintain and 
preserve the balance of power status quo. 
The Philippines 
The relationship with the Philippines has been long-
standing due to historical ties w.ith the U.S. At the same 
time, within the ASEAN framework, the Philippines is delegated 
the responsibility for the overall U.S. - ASEAN relations be-
cause of its traditional links and U.S. military bases in the 
country. 
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The military bases in the Philippines are vital to both 
the U.S. and the ASEAN. The two bases--Subic Naval Base and 
Clark Air Base--are part of the forward operating bases of 
the U.S. At the same time, the presence of the U.S. military 
strengthens ASEAN confidence in the U.S., strengthens U.S. 
investors' political forecast risk in doing business in ASEAN, 
and counterbalances the Soviet Union's naval presence in the 
region. 
Therefore, the political stability of the Philippines is 
of utmost importance to both the U.S. and ASEAN because of 
the strat~gic military bases. Since the 1970s, the Philippines 
has been ~aced by insu~gent ~orces coming ~rom two main sources: 
"Moros in the South seeking autonomy or independence, and 
communists working thro~ghout the nation to promote revolu-
t
. ..1s ion. Figure '2 illustrates the areas in which the 
inau~g~nta are active •. Even though th.e rule of the presiden-. . 
cy. has shi~ted l;rom Ferdinand Marcoa to Corazon )\quino 
by March. 19-86 ,. the new government still faces a serious 
insurgency problem. Analysts say it is uhlikely that the 
insu~gents, especially the Communist Party, .will lay down 
their revolutionary motives and enter the mainstream of Phi-
lippine life since the fall of Marcos. The insurgents, even 
during the previous regime, were not fighting against Marcos 
personally, but rather against the system of government. As 
such, the insurgency problem has been carried forward to 
Aquino government. To the Communist Party, the one and only 
120 124 
NOTE-As neither the government nor the 
20 
insurg1tnt groups provide systematic Joto 
on areas of insurgent activity, the information 
in this figure must be regarded as tentative. 
[:;··:'·.~:"·:;q Areas where the communist 
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acceptable solution is the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment through a revolutionary process. 
How economic and political conditions develop in the 
Philippines is vital to U.S. interest in the region. The 
removal of the bases will reduce badly needed revenue by 
the Philippines, decrease ASEAN security, and increase the 
Soviet Union's expansionism. Moreover, the bases are stra-
tegically located in the region and is within equal distance 
in times of need for Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. Plans 
to shift the bases away from the Philippines to Palau or Guam 
only decrease U.S. naval strength in the region. Even though 
Singapore provides free port of call for the U.S. navy, it is 
very unlikely that the current government in the Philippines 
will refuse to renew the leases for the use of Subic and 
Clark.as U.S. bases. 
As such, the U.S. military presence is of vital interest 
to both th.e AS.EAN and the U. s .. to co,mhat Soviet Union expan-
sionism in the r~gi.on. The military presence serves the 
overall development of ASEAN, the promotion of international 
trade and the encouragement·o~ sales in agricultural products, 
particularly wheat. 
The ASEAN governments do not want a future decade under 
the Soviet Union and has urged the U.S. to maintain the mili-
tary presence in the region. Even during an October 7, 1977 
visit by the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, 
then President Jimmy Carter of the U.S. has assured the 
Prime Minister that the U.S. has the intention of maintaining 
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naval presence in Southeast Asia in·order to combat Soviet 
naval strength. 16 This philosophy has been echoed by the 
Reagan administration which believes in the importance of 
ASEAN security as part of overall U.S. security in combat-
ting Soviet-inspired activities, either directly or indirect-
ly through its proxy,_ Vietnam. As such, the level of trade 
increase with ASEAN indicates U.S. interest in the region 
and benefits both parties. Also, the presence of U.S. mili-
tary makes the region politically stable. 
The Soviet Union Challenge 
The expansion ideology of th.e Soviet Union is based on 
the fact that it seeks warm water ports for both Soviet naval 
vessels as well as merchant fleets. The home port of 
the Soviet Union at the polar region is frozen a great part 
of the time and, thus, it pursues a policy of expansionism in 
order to. a~qui.re wa.rm water. portEi,.. The Soviet Union als.o 
seeks. to mai.n.tai_n the ba,.lance o;e pow..er game .i.n Southeast As.ia, 
~ . . . . . 
to fill. up the vacuum le~t by th.e U .s. with:drawal from Viet-
nam and to contain her immediate challenger, China, for the 
sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. 
The Soviet Union's wishes brightened after the fall of 
South Vietnam to the communists. At the same time, the· 
. growi~g distrust between Vietnam and China brought Vietnam 
more under the influence of the Soviet Union. Trade embargo, 
U.S. naval presence in Southeast Asia, the need for foreign 
economic aid for development, and pressure from ASEAN states 
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for the Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea, strengthen 
Vietnam's dependence upon the Soviet Union. The ultimate 
proof of this relationship was in Vietnam allowing the Soviets 
access to former U.S. bases in Cam Ranh Bay. 
Figure 3 shows the Soviet Global Power Projection and 
the U.S. challenge in Southeast Asia. It has been estimated 
that cam Ranh Bay is the Largest forward operating base 
for the Soviet Union, outside the Warsaw Pact countries. The 
Soviet Projection of 25-30 ships on the average does pose a 
challenge for both the0 U.S. and the security of ASEAN. 
Figure 4 shows how American and Soviet military bases in 
~· 
Asia maintain the balance of power. Cam Ranh Bay, surely, 
has become a very strategically important forward base for 
the Soviet navy in Southeast Asia. 17 As President Reagan 
said on March 23, .1985, "for the first time in history, _the 
Soviet navy is a force to be reckoned with in the "South 
l;lacific. 1118 At stake. is the vital pas.sage o:I; the Straits 
of Malacca because it serves as. an important lifeline for 
the U.S., ASEAN and Japan. It is through which all Middle 
East oil flows and tpat it is also the vital passage of U.S. 
naval vessels to and from the Indian Ocean. 
Another worry besides the build-up of the Soviet navy 
in Southeast Asia is the change in trade pattern between the 
U.S.S.R. and ASEAN. With the level of protectionism against 
ASEAN imports into the U.S., the Soviet Union's markets 
have become very favorable to ASEAN exports. Trade has 
generally been low between ASEAN and the Soviet Union, but 
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recently there has been a 300 percent increase in ASEAN 
t t th S . u . 19 expor s o e oviet nion. This does not nece?sarily 
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mean that ASEAN will forego U.S. interests for the Soviet 
Union, but the latter nevertheless hopes that with the new 
level of protectionism against ASEAN exports to the U.S., 
it will be able to win ASEAN.alliance away from the old ally, 
U.S. Such a situation is not possible because of ASEAN resis-
tance against Soviet activities in the region and their inten-
tion of living under the U.S. sphere of influence instead of 
the Soviet Union. As Kishore Mahbubani of the Singapore 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "There ii;i virtually no other 
part of the Third World that the Unit~d States can point to as· 
a similar ':s.ucces.s story' of u,.s. forei9n policy. 1120 
Nevertheless, .the Soviet Uni.on h.as: never. given up its 
hopes of spreading influence in Southeast Asia, .to deter the 
U.S. presence and to: control the strategic Straits of Malacca~ 
The soviet Union has, .for a long· ti.me •. bee·n trying to. g.et a 
foothold in ASE.AN, and saw her prQs.pect brighten by th.e pro:-
posed J;>hilippines-Soviet Union cement plant in Semirara 
Is.land. 
21 
Figure 5 shows the proposed Philippines·-Soviet Union 
cement plant. The planned facility will be located about 
200 miles from U.S. military installations in Subic Naval 
Base and Clark Air Base. Strategically, this plant of ~orts 
could force a challenge against U.S. interest in the region 
due to close proximity to· the bases, along with the insur-
gent movement in the country. 
O' 
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European ties with ASEAN countries have long been estab-
lished. !t was through Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia 
that commerce was undertaken between Asia and Europe. China 
was initially motivated by trade. Since the fifties, however, 
another factor motivated it to pay closer attention to ASEAN 
countries; that is, to spread Communism by supporting the 
Communist parties that are active but outlawed in Malaysia, 
Singapore and Indonesia. 
When insurgent movements were active in the Sos, British 
authority in Singapore and Mala.ys.ia. w.as challenged by the 
Communists.. This period was. commonly know.n as the "Emergency" 
in w.hi.ch. th_e Communist ideology· began to make inroads into 
the s.ch.ool system and to indoctrinate th_e youth and students. 
The most serious· challe!lge against an es:tablished order was in 
Indonesia during Sukarno's era, when the Communist movement 
. g_ained wide acceptance and was very active. · 
With a historical fear o;f; China's arohitions in the AS.EAN 
countries, especially in Indonesia, the governments are cau-
tious about every move th.at China undertakes. Even today, 
China has not public-ly denounced the outlawed Communist par-
ties in ASEAN and has not given up the idea of not supporting 
them, a move that ASEAN members wish to see. At the same 
time, the increased participation of China in Southeast Asian 
affairs could destroy ASEAN hopes for a Zone of Peace, Free-
dom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) . 22 To make matters worse, ASEAN 
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fears were strengthened when the U.S. agreed to strengthen 
China's military as part of U.S. strategy to isolate the 
Soviet Union's expansionism and activities. ASEAN members, 
especially Malaysia and Indonesia, fear China in that it may 
regenerate the spread of communism in the region and, at the 
same time, engage in boundary disputes with other countries 
in Southeast Asia. 
Figure 6.shows the areas of conflict in the South China 
Sea as claimed by China. The claims are highly exaggerated 
and lead to very divisove relations with neighboring Indonesia, 
1 . d th h · 1 · . 23 Ma aysia, an e P i ippines. China's motives in pursuing 
its claiin is based upon two p~inciples. One is the area of 
economics, in the sense that the disputed area is believed to 
contain oil deposits. By engaging in oil and other energy 
exploration with the U.S. companies, .China hopes to bring the 
U.S. into the scene, thereby deterring the Soviets or their 
proxy, Vietnam, from heing. active :in the r~gion. 24 The 
second principle is that of ideol~gy·. B.:y increas.i!lg its 
presence, .China hopes to inspire the outlawed and dormant 
Communist parties in the ASEAN states to carry out their 
activities more vigorously. 
If China's territorial claims were· ··valid, especially 
after the strengthening of its armed forces by U.S. military 
sales, it could become a setback for both ASEAN and the U.S. 
For ASEAN, it could disrupt commerce routes and, at the same 
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parties in the region. For the U.S. such a claim is totally 
unacceptable as it would destroy U.S. relations with ASEAN, 
encourage an increase in the Soviet Union's naval presence, 
hinder commerce routes between ASEAN and Japan and the U.S., 
and threaten U.S. security by a blockade of U.S. naval routes 
through .the Straits of Malacca into the Indian Ocean. 
ZOPFAN 
Throughout history, many attempts at unity have been 
taken py countries to establish for themselves a region or 
an area of neutrality in times of war. Such a concept is 
evident .in Southeast Asia which seeks to develop a nautral 
regions which should be immune to and independent of big 
power rivalry. In 1968, Tun Dr .. Ismail Abdul Rahnian of 
Malaysia suggeste·d the concept of a '-'Zone of Peace, ·Freedom 
and Neutrality" lZOPFAN) ~or such a zone independent of bi~ 
powers in Southeast Asia. 25 This novel concept,·called 
ZOPFAN, includes the memher state::;i. of the ASEAN and Indochina. 
For such ·a scheme to have any meaning or val.i.dity, _it must 
be guaranteed by both. the s.uperpowers--the United States and 
the Soviet Union. 
However, .such a scheme for developing a neutral zone 
has remained an inspiration of the proponent country, Malaysia, 
because of non-adherence by Indochina, the U.S., the Soviet 
Union, a~d even ASEAN members like Singapore. 
For their part, the states in the Indochina region have 
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questioned the validity of ZOPFAN and have proposed instead 
the Zone of Peace, Genuine Independence and Neutrality. 1126 
The Indochinese advocate a genuine independence of a nation's 
affairs and the complete removal of foreign military bases 
from the region. Such a move is unacceptable to ASEAN due 
to interlocking relationships between the U.S. and ASEAN and 
a need for u:., S. military presence in the region. 
The U.S. has remained silent on ZOPFAN, mainly because 
of its belief in the maintenance of the balance of power 
Also, such a concept runs contrary to American foreign 
policy objectives of containment and constructive engagement. 
In addition, whatever economic link the U.S. has with any 
nation, it is also supplemented by political links. That is, 
economics and politics .. are not substitutes, .but complimentary 
products. Also, .distrust of the Soviet Union has perpet-
uatea U.S. silence in the ZOPrAN scheme. 
For the Soviet Union, the neutral zone is also unaccep-
27 
table. This is due to various reasons; first, as with the 
U.S. , it believes. in the maintenance of the balance of . 
power game. Second, as with. the Americans, the Soviets 
are s.uspicious of the activities of the other power. Third, 
th.e Vietnamese bases are of very vital importance to the 
U.S.S.R. in strategic terms. The bases at Cam Ranh Bay are 
the forward operating bases for the Soviet Union. Fourth, 
the Vietnamese bases are also warm water ports, a badly need-
ed facility for Soviet naval and merchant vessels. 
The concept of ZOPFAN has also not been favorably regard-
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ed by Singapore, which prefers the balance of power system 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the region. 28 The stand 
by Singapore is, in fact, realistic because of the complexity 
of the region itself. As Morgenthau would say, it is not the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that are changing the world system, but 
rather, it is the Third World countries. States in Southeast 
Asia profess allegiance to either one the two superpowers. As 
such, Singapore's stand reflects the realistic nature of the 
balance of power game. This idea is based upon the preserva-
tion of the status quo. 
Comparing Singapore's stand with facts, one can find 
that a neutralized zone is unacceptable. Southeast Asia has 
traditionally been an area of conquest. An important fea~ure 
of such a zone is that it should have been historically a 
neutralized zone in times of. war, that it hasn't been a· victim 
of war. Only one country in the world has been able to main-
tain its neutrality--Switzerland--because of power relationships 
during the 18th and 19th centuries have been short-lived. As 
for Southeast Asia, the region has been historically an area 
of conquest. Tradi trionally, .rulers. o:e Thailand have been· 
conquering countries in Southeast Asia. Rulers from Indone-
sia have been in conquest of neighbori~g countries. Also, 
there have been conquests by European powers for the purpose 
of establishing markets, extracting raw materials and main-
taining sea powers. There were conquests in Southeast Asia 
by the Dutch, the Spanish, the Americans, the British, and 
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the French. 
Moreover, not only has Southeast Asia been historically 
an area of conquest, but the region is also strategically 
located. Important routes of commerce and communication and 
abundance of natural resources have vested the region as a 
"gold mine." It is an area of the world that anyone would 
like to have . 
Singapore's stand on the maintenance of the balance of 
power, therefore, ref lee ts the reality of power relarionships 
among nations. The idea of ZOPFAN is an idealistic vision 
which can do more harm than good. Singapore believes in 
maintenance of the status quo because the implementation of 
a neutralized zone is difficult and also challenges the es-
tablished balance of power relationship. The difficulty in 
the implementation of a neutralized zone is based upon the 
behavior of human beings, which, in turn, become evident in 
the relationships of nations. "Man is basically a wanting 
being and is not satisfied wLttlr what he has and seeks· more."1129 
Putting such a statement into a Southeas·t Asian context, 
we can restate th.at .the ASEAN region is. strategically located 
and vested w.i th abundant natural res,ources. that any nation 
would like to have. Th·ere·fore, .it is realistic to maintain 
a balance of power in the region rather than have an artifi-
cial zone of peace, .freedom and neutrality. The maintenance 
of the status quo is more important than challenging it, be-




This chapter sought to analyze U.S. political interest 
in the ASEAN region. The Third World view of dependency and 
exploitation is unacceptable because ASEAN has indirectly 
benefitted from the U.S. military presence. The establishment 
of trade with ASEAN countries set the ground for U.S. politic-
al inwolvement in the region. Not only is the U.S. able to 
carry out its policy of constructive engagement, it has also 
set the ground for its second policy objective of containment 
of Soviet activities. Changing trade patterns between the 
Soviet Union and ASEAN, challenges from China, and the idea 
of ZOPFAN strengthened U.S. presence in the ergion. ASEAN 
countries view every move that the U.S. undertakes as promot-
ing America's own interest, first and foremost. However, 
ASEAN also needs the U.S. in the region to preserve the status 
quo and to deter the Soviet Union in the region. U.S. security 
inte~ests, as a result, are interlocked with its trade rela-
tions, leading to a net benefit for both the U.S. and ASEAN. 
Iiowever, the level o:f; politi.cal and economic interdependence 
that .the U.S. s:tnd ASEAN have achi.eved so far could be. des-
troyed due to growing U.S. protectionism, which seeks to hin-
der free trade. Chapter V will discuss U.S. and ASEAN trade 
issues as they relate to protectionism and how they would 
affect U.S. and ASEAN interdependence. 
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CHAPTER V 
UNITED STATES - ASEAN TRADE ISSUES 
Introduction 
Since the 1970s, nations worldwide have moved into an 
era of interdependence. More issues of common interest 
became important as indicators of various levels of inter-
relationship among states and also as signals of what could 
be conditions in the future. Since the formation of ASEAN, 
the region's relationship with the U.S. has become the center 
of overall U.S. ties with this part of the world in terms 
of economic and political significance. 
Various conferences and meetings ha~e been convened 
between the U.S. and ASEAN to discuss trade issues. Commonly 
known as the "U.S. - ASEAN Dialogue," the representatives 
from each member country are brought together to discuss 
matters relating to their common interests. So far, there 
have been six such dialogues held with the U.S., the last 
being in Washington in April 1985. The meeting discusses 
international economic issues, international trade issues 
and development cooperation. 1 
The ongoing conferences are a reflection of ':he concern 
of protectionism. The world has witnessed an increasing amount 
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of pro.tecti.onism, .both by developing as well as developed 
countries, against each other's. products. Such practice 
hinders: free trade and indui:;;trial innovation. The net 
results are evident in decreased consumer welfare.· 
One of the most controversial and long-standing protec-
tionistic barriers amo!lg nations has been on the textile 
commodity. In 19.35, there was the first restriction on 
textile products. ~gainst Japanese. goods in th.e United States 
so as to protect domestic industries. 2 In the 1980s, the 
U.S. became flooded with cheap textile products from Asian 
countries and Brazil, threatening the textile industry in 
the U.S. Such practice is common not only in the U.S., but 
also amo!lg developing countries. This means that not only 
do developed countries undertake protectionism, but also 
developing countries, for reasons such as the protection of 
domestic markets and industries. 
The purpose of this chapter is to look at various conunon 
types of trade barriers, and the issue of textiles as well, 
as it applies to ASEAN' s exports to the U.S., .and counter 
measures by ASEAN. 
Types of Protectionism 
Since the early 19705, _due to unstable patterns of trade, 
nations. began to impose restrictions for various kinds of 
reasons. Th.e main reason has· been the famous. issue of infant 
industry arguments. That is, .the_ government intervenes in 
the economy so as to prote.ct domes.tic indus-try ~gainst foreign 
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competition. Th.is is done to enable domestic industries 
to improve its technolc:)gy and managerial skills, allowing 
it to compete in the international market .in the future. 
However, such protectionistic measures sometimes remain 
permanently because of interest. group pressures on govern-
ment in order to have a continuous advantage against other 
countries. Such a move destroys. the initial intention of the 
protection and, instead, becomes a political issue. 
The common types of restraint or protection against 
imports are: 
(i) Development of Import Substitution Industries. 
Tpis strategy of the government provides incentives to 
firms so they could produce items which are currently be-
ing impo.rted. The aim is to manufacture enough of such 
items, so the country can even export it. This is achieved 
through high tar±ff so as to increase price to domestic con-
sumers, so as to enable domestic producers to increase their 
profit margin. 
(ii} Export Subsidy. This is commonly known as dumping 
and is widely used in the wheat trade. Government provides 
incentives to firms so as to reduce the export price, 
thereby. gaining extra markets and reducing world prices. 
liii} Import Subsidy. This is. given to industries to 
expand their size and to decre~se cost of production 
in ligh.t of import competition. 
(ivl Import Tariff. This raises domestic price by a 
tax on imports, enabling domestic producers to sell 
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their producta in the domes.tic market w.ith. an import tax on 
imports.. 
lv) Import Quotas. This restricts the volume of 
imports into the country. 
. 3 
lvi) Voluntary Export Restraints (VER). This in-
volves bilateral agreements among countries which induces 
participants to voluntarily restrict their exports into 
a buying country. For example, Japan has, on her own,. 
cut back on the number of automobiles it exports to the 
United States, in response to a growing sentiment in favor 
of allowing the U.S. automotive .industry get back on its feet. 
Textile Imports from ASEAN 
There has been an increase in the amount of textile 
imports into the U.S. at the cost of the local textile indus-
try. The ability of foreign textile to penetrate the U.S. 
market is because of the low cost of production, free market, 
and the ability to respond.to consumer demand. The exports 
of textile products are mainly from Japan, Hong Kong, .Taiwan, 
South Korea, _China and ASEAN. 
Table X shows the la:r-gest exporters of textile to the 
U.S. This group is comprised by about 22 countries for 1983 
and 1984. The ASEAN exports made up only 8.99 percent of 
the imports as of 1984, whereas the largest exporters were 
Taiwan, .Hong Kong, South Korea, _China and _Japan making up 
60 percent of the volume. This shows that ASEAN exports 
























MAJOR TEXTILE EXPORTERS 
TO THE UNI~ED STATES 
1984 1985 1985 
(.million US$) (.% l tmillion 
2,440.8 16. 6 1,984.1 
2,390.6 16.2 2,051.4 
1,872.l 12.7 1,514.6 
1,110.3 7.5 923.2 
1,009.5 6.9 811.0 
736.0 5.0 374.2 
391.1 2 • 7. 291. 8 
375.l 2.6 284. 3 
300. 7 2.0 200.6 
270.2 1.9 175.0 
264.7 1.8 178.7 
263.8 1.9 151. 8 
243.3 1. 7 159.4 
226.2 1.5 86.7 
205.2 1.4 126.5 
182.6 1.2 87.3 
176.4 1. 2 139.5 
174.0 1. 2 104.5 
176.2 1. 2 118.7 

























TABLE X (.CONTINUED) 
Country 1984 1984 1985 1985 
(.million US$) (.%) (_million US$) (_%) 
Canada 16 7. 3 1.1 116.5 1.0 
Malaysia* 156.8 1.1 87.4 0.8 
Total of 22 13,469.5 91.5 9,975.5 91.1 
Minor exporters 1,248.6 8.5 972. 9 8.9 
Total Overall 14, 718.0 100.0 10,948.4 100.0 
*Total ASE AN 1,322.7 9.0 810.8 
Source: U.S. House, Committee on Ways and Means. Trade 
Mission to the Far East (H. Rpt. 99-13), 
Washington: Government Prinintg Office, 1986, 
p. 19 8. 
7.4 
Altho!-lg_h ASEAN textile exp·orts make up only 8. 99 percent 
of U.S. imports for 1984, _it shows the ability of ASEAN coun-
tries to produce diversified products, i.e., textile, among 
other things. This move is contrary to Prebisch's hypothe-
sis that developing countries are only agricultural product 
exporters and do not benefit from trade relations with the 
developed countries. Also, ASEAN's ability to penetrate the 
U.S. domestic market indicates the ability of the ASEAN coun-
tries to win the hearts and minds of American consumers. 
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Jenkins Bill 
One of the mos.t controvers.ial l~gislations that divided 
house members in the United Sta.tea and also encouraged the 
exporting Third World countries to voice opinions against 
protectionism by President Reagan has been the Jenkins 
Bill, commonly known as the textile bill. This bill, though, 
was vetoed by Reagan; it sought to reduce the level of tex-
tile imports into the United States, and is one of many cur-
rently before the U.S. Congress and seeking to restrict 
imports so that domestic industries could be protected, local 
jobs saved, and trade imbalances improved. 
The U.S. textile industry ~as been one of the most sue-
cessful interest groups that had been able to lobby the_ gov-
ernment to impose restrictions on imports. Among _the regions 
affected by the bill will be ASEAN, a textile supplier 
to the U.S. and a relatively newcomer among other established 
suppliers. 
Even tho~gh the textile bill has been vetoed, defenders 
of the bill claim that there has been a loss of about 300,000 
jobs in the U.S. since 1980 as a result of imports. 4 They 
also warned that the entire textile industry in the U.S. 
could disappear by 1990.
5 
Advocates against the textile bill 
a!gued that such a bill would hurt U.S. foreign relations, 
especially with strategic countries and export demand indus-
tries of the U.S. 
Besides hurting ·consumers with higher prices and hurting 
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U .s. :e.oreign relations., the textile bill will lead to restric-
tive trade practices w.hich could provoke counter measures by 
ASEAN. Such practices could damage export demand industries 
such as aircraft production, high technolo.gy, _agriculture and 
6 
service indus:tries. The wheat exports could be hurt because 
of competition from Australia. 
The trade imbalance between the U.S. and ASEAN is not 
significant enough to restrict ASEAN exports. The main 
beneficiary nations that have trade surpluses are Japan, 
with one-third of the surplus over the U.S.; Western Europe-; 
Canada,and Taiwan. 7 The trade deficit of the U.S. reached 
$148.5 billion in 1985. Japan had the greatest trade surplus, 
$49.7 billion; Western Europe, .$27.4 billion; Canada, $22.2 
billion, and Taiwan, $13.l billion.
8 
The U.S. trade deficit has been viewed by promoters 
of import restriction as an erosion of the manufacturing base 
of the U.S. Promoters of protectionism in the U.S. stress 
that the reasons for the trade deficit are the cheap imports 
from other nations.which, in turn, cause the loss of jobs 
in America. Also cited are the unfair trading practices on 
U.S. exports by the world community. At the same time, the 
strength of the American dollar with respect to other monies 
has made U.S. Products too expensive to compete in the 
world market. The U.S. dollar is h~ghly volatile, thereby 
- 9 
hurting U.S. exports. The trade problem is reflected in 
the textile bill which seeks to address the issue of protec-
tionism. 
88 
De:eenders of the textile hill claim that even with 
the improvement in technology·, th_e U.S. textile ind us try 
still cannot compete ~gainst exports from low wage countries. 
There are tw:o sides to this dilemma. One is that it is true 
that labor standards are low in many Asian countries and, at 
times, below the acceptable international labor standards. 
For this, _the U.S. can use the international labor standards 
as a bargaining tool so as to make these countries that want 
to trade with the U.S. to improve their labor standards. 10 
Among ASEAN countries, Singapore's wage rates are comparable 
to those in the U.S., while Indonesia's are in the low scales. 
The second dilemma is within the U.S. textile industry 
itself. Much of the textile industry in·1estment has not 
been wisely spent on the industry, which tries to produce more 
rather than improving on flexibility in the production pro-
cess .11 At the same time, the U.S. textile industry has not 
been able to respond to U.S. consumers' taste, in which Asian 
countries have an advantage. 12 Also, U.S. government support 
prices designed to protect cotton farmers.forces the textile 
mill owners to purchase cotton at levels above world market 
prices. Only by the end of this year will U.S. textile mill 




Defenders of the textile bill als.o claim that the ASEAN 
countries, particularly Singapore and Malaysia, have been 
engagi~g in u:i._~air trading practices that all the members 
except Brunei seek to export more than their allowed quota 
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through. a third country. For example, 11 Sinc~·apore, which offers 
U.S. authorities. the lowest level of cooperation in the Asian 
region, serves as· a base ~or th.e trans:h~·pmerit of clothing from 
. 14 
Malaysia and China." This is because of Singapore's belief 
in free trade in that the economy is only engaging in import 
and export and, as such, does not seek to restrict trade prac-
tices. At the same time, the growth rates from ASEAN coun-
tries' clothing exports to the U.S. between 1980 and 1984 has 
increased greatly in each country. For example, "Indonesian 
exports increased by 2263 percent; Singapore, 79 percent; 
15 
and Malaysia, 282 percent." 
This ~gains shows the ability o:f; ASEAN to increase 
their textile exports to the U.S.. The :Prebisch hypothesis. 
that developing countries receive less and less for their 
exports and, thus, do not benefit from them, is not accepta-
ble. ASEAN has been able to increase its. exports; it has 
also been able to win the hearts and minds of American con-
sumers. As a result, ASEAN seeks to maximize their benefits 
just as the U.S. seeks to maximize its benefits in the wheat 
trade. 
What the bill calls for under the "Textile and Appraisal 
Trade Enforcement Act of 1985" is that the major exporting 
countries' imports should be reduced percentage-wise. Reduc-
tion in trade is required from the 12 major exports in Asia 
16 
and South America. Table XI shows the percentage of reduction 
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Source: U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance, .Textile and Apparel 
Trade Enforcement Act Hearing, July 15, 1985 
(No. 223), Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1985, p. 332. 
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Brazil. Both Indonesia and Thailand could be badly hurt be-
cause of dependence upon textile industries for job creation 
and economic development in their respective countries. Res-
triction in ASEAN textile exports could cause problems in the 
labor industries of ASEAN. For example, Thailand could see 
its textile exports to the U.S. cut by 64 percent, which is 
enough to eliminate 100,000 jobs in Thailand and could lead 
17 
to social unrest. At the same time, the bill is directed 
to the Asian countries and Brazil, .and excludes exports from 
18 
the European community and Canada. Such practice could hurt 
U. s. foreign policies and exports, to the Third World which 
could view. the U.S. move ai;;. di scrimina ti ve ~gains t them and 
in favor of the Europ~an Economic Community and Qanada. 
Even in countries like Si!lgapore, _there are plans of 
doing away with the textile industry because of protectionism 
in the international markets, .es.pecially when u.s. domestic 
industries are both inefficient and unable to meet domestic 
U.S. consumers' tastes. Thailand has also advocated that 
the Jenkins Bill is inconsistent with the Multi-Fiber Agree-
, .. .n:- ) • • 19 . ment l.J."~A principles. Article III, Section 1 states: 
Unless they are justi£ied under the provisions 
of GATT, no new restrictions on trade.in textile 
products shall be introduced .by ·participating coun-
tries, nor shall existing.· restrictions be intensified, 
unless such action is justified under the provisions 
of this AJ;ticle .20 
The inconsistency is also found under Article VI, 
Section 1, which states: 
Recognizing the obligations of participating 
countries to pay special attention to the needs of the 
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developing countries, it shall be considered appro-
priate and consistent with equity obligations for the 
importing countries which apply restrictions under this 
Arrangement affecting the trade of developing countries 
to provide more favorable terms with regard to such 
restrictions, including elements such as base level and 
growth, rather than other countries.21 
As such; _the bill is directed to the Third World, but favors 
the exports from the developed world. 
Not only has the textile bill created reaction from 
ASEAN, and violated the MFA principl.es, but the hill h.as also 
divided the opinions of members of Congress. Trade is 
an issue that has often divided members of Congress more along 
regional lines rather than party affiliation. Trade benefits 
certain states. but, _at the s.aroe tiroe, hlirts. other states. in 
the u. s. ·Members. ·froqi. states; that are_ generally dependent 
upon international trade, .such as the Pacific states and, 
lately, _the agricultural states, .were_ generally against the 
textile bill, _whereas members from southern and eastern 
states where textile interests are particularly important, 
were in support of the bill. 22 
Critics of the textile bill have argued that any job 
saved would be almost balanced by job losses in the retail and 
transportation industries, as consumers cut back purchases of 
high-priced goods. The bill would have saved about 70,000 
23 jobs, but eliminate 65,000 jobs in retail only. The textile 
bill would lead to economic disaster not only for industries 
in the U.S. that depend upon international trade, but also in 
other countries, particularly ASEAN, which depends upon inter-
national trade for economic and political progress. 
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Not only would export-based U.S. industries be affected, 
but also the consumers'surplus. With the textile bill, 
prices will be raised above competitive world market prices, 
leading to a decrease in the cons.umers.' surplus. This in-
volves favoring the industries at the expense of consumers. 
Also, the failure of the textile bill to gain tbe necessary 
vote for passage came before Congress at a bad time because 
of the speech made before Congress by the visiting Prime 
24 
Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew. He attacked world 
protectionism , causing some members of Congress to rethink 
about protectionism and its effects. on mankind, economic 
development and political s.tabilit~{· The effects of the 
Prime Minister's speech against protectionism still li!lge:rs 
25 
in the minds of many congressmen. 
Copyright Piracy in ASEAN 
Another major trade issue between the U.S. and ASEAN 
within protectionism is the level of copyright piracy of 
U.S. Products in the ASEAN markets. This involves the dupli-· 
cation of products without royalties to the U.S. firms-
As such, it hinders the actual trade without the copyright 
piracy between the U.S. and ASEAN. 
The reasons nations engage in copyright piracy is because 
of consumers' limited income, the high cost of U.S. products 
and the ability of the business industries within the Third 
World to increase profit margins. This is supplemented by a 
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lack of copyright laws within the countries. The level of 
piracy exists in different degrees across Asia, Africa, Europe 
26 
and the U.S. Not only are the music tapes, books and video 
tapes being copied, but with the increase in high technology, 
"computer software and hardware are being copied, representing 
27 
millions of dollars in investment." 
As part of the Reagan philosophy in cornbatting unfair 
trading practices, the administration has been requesting 
countries with copyright piracy problems to pass laws so as 
to protect U.S. intellectual markets, rights and benefits in 
the region. The administration has also considered denying 
those countries. with copyright piracy ·tr.ade benefits with 
the U.S. so as to encourage the.se nations to take a stand 
within th.eir markets in order to prate.ct U.S. property 
. h 28 rig ts. The main countries which are havens for copyright 
piracy are Hong Kong, South Korea:, Taiwan and Singapore. 
In the ASEAN markets, there has also been the presence 
of copyright piracy, _especially on U.S. products. There have 
been reports which claini. Singapore as the "world capital of 
piracy," even though with a highly developed economy and a 
leading beneficiary under the Generalized System of Preference 
29 (GSP) for imports to the U.S. The piracy exports from 
Singapore is well organized within ASEAN and also globally 
exporting "billions of dollars of pirated works throughout 
30 
the world." In response to the U.S., the Singapore govern-
ment passed laws in March 1986 to combat piracy of foreign 
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products, much to the pleasure of the Reagan administration. 
At the same time, legal proceedings have been brought against 
pirates along with the domestic police in Si~gapore destroying 
31 
an average of 200,000 pirated tapes per annum since 1980. The 
enactment of the Copyright Law in Singapore is the belief in 
establishing free trade and part of the government's efforts 
in making Singapore the brain center of the world. 
The other ASEAN countries I .notably Malaysia and Indonesia I 
have also taken steps in combatting copyright piracy. There 
has been pass.age of copyright laws in both of these countries, 
where piracy is. a problem, so as to protect intellectual pro-
perty righ.ts. 
32 
The combatting of piracy is part of ASEAN 
efforts in bring-ing about fair trading practices among nations 
and to reduce. barriers ~gainst foreign product~. 
The reason that copyright piracy exists in these nations 
is because of the high price of the ·or~ginal product. For 
example,· .U.S. manufactured music tapes cost about US$8.00 in 
Singapore. Such an item can be copied and sold for US$2.00 
in Singapore and ne~ghbori~g countries, _much to the afforda-
bility of the consumers. The prices of U.S. products is be-
yond the reach of the average person in ASEAN. The tendency 
of consumers in ASEAN to .buy pirated tapes is becaus.e they 
only listen to the songs for a few months, and so returns 
on investment is well undertaken. Such practice is common 
among students who have limited income. Secondly, the sound 
difference between the original tape and the pirated tape is 
not significant and consumers are rational human beings who 
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seek to maximize their benefits with the least cost. Thus, 
a US$2.00 pirated tape brings more benefit over a US$8.00 
original tape for the average consumer. 
Even though the piracy problem has been solved by passage 
of copyright laws in ASEAN, the market, however, can still 
penetrated from supplies outside the region. Copyright pira-
cy is a thing that needs global cooperation. The U.S. has 
the political clout to seek copyright laws with nations under 
its influence. As such, _copyright piracy requires the coop-
eration among participating and concerned countries, so as to 
bring about better trading practices amo~g nations. 
It may seem that Prebisch' s views have found some grounds 
in the piracy iss.ue. Th.e reason A8.EAN had e~g~ged in copy_-
right piracy· is because it did not henefi t by trading in 
particular commodities. Some U.S. products, such as music 
tapes, are beyond the reach of average ASEAN consumers. This 
is not because the cost of U.S. tapes are high, but because 
merchants in both ASEAN and the U.S. seek to maximize their 
profits at the expense of the average consumers. However, 
ASEAN has taken steps to bring about fair trading practices 
by passing copyright laws that protect intellectual rights. 
Summary 
This chapter analyzes protectionism between the U.S. and 
ASEAN in two areas: textile imports and copyright piracy. 
The textile bill seeks to restrict textile imports from ASEAN 
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so as to protect domestic industries at the expense of con-
sumers. At the same time, this step hinders free trade whd..ch:. 
could develop into a foreign policy obstacle for the U.S. in 
the region. ASEAN countries have also expressed the view that 
the textile bill is in violation of the Multi-Fiber Agreement 
while being in favor of European exporters. Also, the issue 
has been directed at ASEAN which exports insignificant volumes 
of goods to affect the U.S. textile industry. Concerning 
copyright piracy, ASEAN ha.s taken steps to curb the practice, 
a move that is welcomed by the U.S. as a step toward fair 
trade among nations. 
The concluding chapter restates the conditions of 
U.S.-ASEAN trade and security relations and draws conclusions 
regarding the applicability of Preb.ii;;.ch.' s hypothes.is; on 
this particular regional situation. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has looked at the development of u.s.-ASEAN 
relations since 1967, along with their respective interests 
in trade and security. The hypothesis was put forward by 
Prebisch to analyze the relationships of deve.loped and deve-
loping countries. It said, just as many trade pessimist 
theorists and Third World countries believed, that developing 
countries which are primary pr9ducrt::exporters, do not benefit 
from trade with the developed world because the developed 
world seeks to maximize their own benefits while exploiting 
the developing countries. However, the u.s~-ASEAN relation-
ship does not support this view. ASEAN nations do benefit 
from their trade and security relationship with the U.S. 
A history of colonization, feelings of insecurity follow-
ing independence, and fear and suspicions of other countries, 
brought the non-Communist block in Southeast Asia to form 
a regional organization, ASEAN. They seek to achieve a com-
mon objective of maximizing benefits from the region. By 
pursui~g a_ group objective, ASEAN nations seek, first, to 
maximize their economic bargaining position with trading 
partners, e.g., the United States; second, to secure for 
themselves security interests with the U.S. in order to deter 
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soviet activities in the regioni and, .third, to benefit from 
inte~national trade. 
Not only does ASE'AN seek to maximize its interest of 
survival and maximization of power, so does the U.S. which 
is governed by her own national interest of survival and 
maximization of power. One of the American interests in 
ASEAN is the strategic location of the countries along the 
world's busiest shipping lanes, namely, the Straits of Ma-
lacca. Any unfriendly action by the Soviet Union, for example, 
could cause a disruption of the economies in ASEAN and Japan. 
It can also restrict the movement of U.S. naval movement. 
Secondly, the U.S. aims to carry out the policy of 
constructive engagement by which it helps to develop the eco-
nomies of friendly countries. An example is the increased 
use of P.L. 480 aid to reduce tension in Indonesia in 1963-
1965. 
Third, the U.S. wants to remain in the economic rat race 
and maintain her trade position in ASEAN vis-a-vis other eco-
nomic giants such as Australia, Canada, the European Economic 
Community, Japan and New Zealand. 
Fourth, the U.S. seeks to maximize benefits for herself 
in international trade. 
Fifth, the U.S. aims to carry out its foreign policy 
objective of containment of the Soviet Union in Southeast 
Asia. 
Therefore, both ASEAN and the U.S. seek to survive and 
maximize their own powers as part of their national interests. 
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By power, th_e author. does. not mean the actual use of physical 
force, _but rather the us.e of psychology· as a political weapon. 
This means the ability of one state, _nation A, to control 
the minds and actions of the other, nation B, in order to 
induce nation B to do what nation A wants it to do. The po-
litical power of nation A must be legitimate in the view of 
nation B. The reason nation B responds to nation A is not 
because of fear of punishment or love of others, but rather 
because of nation B's expectation of maximizing its benefits. 
This, however, is based on the assumption that each nation has 
already conquered its own mind before controlling the minds 
of others. Thus, both nations seek to maximize their own 
benefits from international relations by engaging in alliances 
with others--economically and politically. Both economic and 
political interaction are interchangeable; that is, both 
forces move in the same direction, supplementing each other's 
objectives to accomplish their foreign policy goals. ·There-
fore, every nation needs the minimum kevel to survive within 
its own boundary and to maximize benefits from international 
interaction. 
The U.S., in order to carry out her foreign policy ob-
jectives of constructive engagement and containment, engages 
in international trade, which sets the ground for promoting 
its political interest in Southeast Asia. The nature of in-
ternational relations has changed over time and nations have 
to learn to control the minds of others. Imperialism, colo-
nization and military force are phenomena of the past. With 
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a changing environment, .inte~national trade has become a tool 
for ach;leving state objectives. Nations. e~gage in interna-
tional trade in order to benefit themselves and to export 
those products in which it has the least cost input. Not on-
ly does specialization and product efficiency become a part 
of international trade, but a state also seeks to sell her 
ideology and political interests through trade. Because of 
this, ASEAN has become the United States' fourth largest trad-
ing partner as of 1984. Althought the tables show that the 
U.S. has a trade surplus with ASEAN as a whole, conclusions 
cannot be drawn from this because it is dependent upon what 
commodities make up the tables. At the same time, nations 
seek to export those products in which they have a comparative 
advantage. 
The ability of the u.s~ to control the minds of the ASEAN 
nations can be seen in the use of P.L. 480, which was imple-
mented as a tool for constructive engagement, resulting in 
the economic abd political development of ASEAN, and to assure 
fu,ture U ;iS. agricultural sales, especially of wheat. American 
wheat has made inroads into the traditional rice-producing 
regions and has been successful in selling her wheat in the 
traditional Australian markets. The initial impact of U.S. 
wheat through the P.L. 480 program provided political stabi-
lity during the Sukerno era in Indonesia by reducing the po-
pularity of the Communist movement. -At the same time, the 
trade pessimists' _view that only developing countries are 
producers of agricultural products is not valid in this case. 
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Not only is. the U.S. an industrial pow.er, .it also supplies. 
wheat and makes a profi tahle inves.tment fro..m the venture. 
In order to streng,tflen wheat sales- to ASEAN and to maintain 
its political interest, the U.S. has provided benefits such 
as low interest rates, technical handlin.g of wheat, and long-
term repayment periods. Thus, the U.S. achieves her political 
and economic objectives. ASEAN also benefits from the credit 
incentives, an abilndant wheat supply, and the reduction of 
ASEAN vulnerability to rice imports. As a whole, the U.S. 
has been able to achieve her first foreign policy obejctive 
o~ constructive engagement, gaining new markets and disposing 
of excess supplies. ASEAN has benefitted from favorable 
trade terms with the U.S. ASEAN has also been able to real-
ize that by engaging in international trade with the U.S., 
ASEAN will be able to achieve its own objectives in security 
relations wi.th the U.S. 
Thus, in.international trade, we have shown that Prebisch's 
hypothesis that developing countries do not benefit in their 
relations with the developed world does not hold water. ASEAN 
benefits in its relations with the U.S. With international 
~rade, the U.S. has been able to achieve her second objective 
of containment of the Soviet Union in the region. At the same 
time, the U.S. has been able to protect strategic sea lanes, 
especially the Straits of Malacca, for commerce and military 
use, to gain alliances and to protect estanlished markets and 
interests. Overall, the U.S. seeks to maintain the balance 
of power in the ·region through increased trade. With the pre-
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sence of U .s. securi t¥ interes.t in the area, ASEAN also has 
been able to realize its. ow:n security interests. ASEAN has 
to depend upon the U.S. to deter the Soviet activities, be-
cause ASEAN nations do not have the necessary forces to do so. 
The presence of U.S. forces in the region helps reduce their 
fear of the Soviet Union, helped transform ASEAN into a favor-
able investment site, and made ASEAN one of the most political-
ly stable communities in the world. 
As nations become more interdependent in their relations, 
trade and security become important factors in shaping their 
relationships. Since 1967, there has been a marked increase 
in trade and security interest between ASEAN and the U.S. 
However, progress made so far could be destroyed by current 
issues of protectionism and unfair trading practices. Meas-
ures are taking place within Congress to protect domestic 
industries against imports and against other domestic indus-
tries that depend upon international trade. This shows that 
not only are industries within the U.S. interdependent, but 
so are the nations. Policy in favor of one industry can af-
fect the performance of the other industry. 
The textile industry in the U.S. is a good example of 
advocating protectionism since.the 1930s. Even though the 
textile bill has been vetoed by President Reagan, ASEAN, a 
relatively newcomer to U.S. text1.le markets, could see its 
exports reduced. Such a bill would harm U.S. and ASEAN rela-
tions because both of them are dependent upon international 
trade for economic development. The Jenkins Bill (textile 
bill) calls for a 41 percent reduction in ASEAN textile 
imports. 
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At the moment, ASEAN has adopted a policy of "wait and 
see" regarding U.S. legislative action in the matter. At 
the same time, it depends upon the Reagan administration to 
uphold free trade and to khock down trade barriers around 
the world. Japan, Canada and the European Economic CoIT.munity 
which progressed equally at the expense of U.S. trade, sJ:?.ould 
reduce t:heir trade barriers and contribute to a better trad-
ing environment. These nations: should now take a responsibi-
lity because they have benenf i.tted initially from generous 
U.S. trade restraints. The U.S. still has the industrial 
base necessary to motivate states within their sphere ·of 
inf.luence to bri!1g_ about better t~.adi!lg practices.. At the 
s.ame time, .the U.S. can use ·other methods to make ha tions 
bri!1g about fair trade practices; for example, the return 
of Okinawa Island to Japan as a bargaining tool to bring 
about better trading practice with Japan. 1 
Another trade issue between the·U.S. and ASEAN is the 
copyright piracy in ASEAN. Such a scheme causes a decrease 
in potential trade of intel1J.ectual property rights of the 
U.S. Recently, ASEAN countries have passed laws to protect 
U.S. intellectual property rights, a move which has pleased 
the Reagan administration as a atep in the right direction 
toward fair trade practices. 
It has been shown that nations have ot be more inter-
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dependent upon each other in order to achieve individual 
goals. The hypothesis that the Third World does not benefit 
in their relations with advanced nations is inapplicable to 
u.s.-ASEAN relations. ASEAN countries have benefitted in 
their relationships with the U.S. The transformation of the 
ASEAN region from an underdeveloped one into a developing 
and politically stable region has been one of the success-
ful stories in U.S. foreign policy objectives. 2 There is no 
place in the Third World where the U.S. foreign policy objec-
tives have been successful other than in ASEAN, where the 
ability to control minds and actions of others has been real-
ized. Thus, both parties have maximized their interests and 
objectives. 
Protectionism and restrictive trade is not a solution to 
the trade ilttbalance. The U. s. mus.t he aware of what protec-
tionism i.n the U.S. contrib.uted to th.e 19.30 s--Depression 
and World War II. Such a situation should not be repeated. 
The U.S. has been able to win the hearts and minds of the 
ASEAN people and should take every precaution not to destroy 
this relationship. 
Not only has the ASEAN benefitted, but interdependence 
with the U.S. has also become the phenomenon of the day. The 
sucessful evolution of ASEAN and the development of U.S.-
ASEAN relationship signifies growing potential of the Pacific 
Rim countries, of which ASEAN and the United States are part. 
The author hopes that more effort will be placed on 
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furthering the ASEAN-U.S. relationship and on establishing 
the extent of each nation's benefit. Trade and security 
issues signify the degree to which nations are willing to 
cooperate in international relations. Free trade, not pro-
tectionism, is a solution to the economic development of the 
free world. As of this writing, there are· a number of issues 
which are ongoing and controversial within the U.S. It will 
be interesting to see what these issues hold, especially pro-
tectionism, in the overall U.S. and free world relationship. 
The author is well aware of critcism that might arise 
from this study. Emphasis on what commodities make up the 
trade pattern should be made, and percentages should be es-
tablished regarding benefits to individual states. Also, the 
fluctuation in wheat prices should be reflected to show the 
reality in wheat purchases. It is hoped that in the future, 
more emphasia w..i11 b.e show.n on the level of security b.ene.fi ts 
that each_ ·nation obtains.. aowever, .s.ecurity· is an inta!lgible 
asset that is difficult to quantify. The actual outcome of 
ongoing issues on protectionism and unfair trading practices 
should be pursued to show the future level of interdependence. 
~evertheless, one can concJude that the reason nations 
engage in international interaction is to survive and to maxi-
mize their own interests. Thus, both ASEAN and the U.S. seek 
to maximize their benefits from their interaction. To bring 
about a healthier trading environment, nations that have bene-
fi tEed from U.S. liberal trade policies should now provide 
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stability to the international order. The libe~al trade poli-
cies of the U.S. helped build the dynamic economies of the 
free world. It is time that nations such as Canada, Japan 
and West Germany, which have benefitted from U.S. policies, 
contribute to fair trade. Protectionism is not the solution 
to the U.S. trade deficits. Protectionism contributes to an 
unstable economic and political order. As the Honorable Lee 
Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, said 
before the U.S. Congress, "In your hands ... lie the future 
of the world. 113 This statement bears validity in explaining 
the state of relationships in the free world. 
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